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The Problem of Enforcing
Environmental Norms in the WTO
and What To Do About It
By SANFORD E. GAINES*
Introduction
Conventional environmental wisdom holds that environmental
degradation continues largely unchecked even though environmental
agreements and organizations have proliferated in the last thirty
years.' The new international environmental organizations are
criticized for having failed to develop coherent environmental norms2
and having failed to devise effective mechanisms to induce their
observance Commentators variously attribute the inability to
* Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center. The author bene-
fited from comments and questions at the Hastings symposium in February, 2003,
and from an exchange of ideas with Prof. Daniel Esty. The views expressed here, of
course, remain my sole responsibility.
1. E.g., Paul Wapner, World Summit on Sustainable Development: Toward a
Post-Jo'burg Environmentalism, 3 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 1 (2003).
Wapner declares, "Since Rio, despite impressive texts, new and improved
institutions, and the ever-widening dissemination of environmental values,
widespread environmental degradation continues almost unabated." Id. at 7. He
also comments that "[t]he disconnect between environmentalism and environmental
quality is well-known and firmly part of conventional environmental wisdom." Id.
2. "[T]he management of international environmental affairs has little structure
and is marked by policy gaps, confusion, duplication, and incoherence." DANIEL C.
ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 78 (1994)
[hereinafter ESTY, GREENING].
3. Esty and Ivanova define an "implementation gap" resulting from
administrative overload, shortage of financing, and the lack of serious enforcement
provisions in international environmental agreements. Daniel C. Esty & Maria H.
Ivanova, Revitalizing Global Environmental Governance: A Function-Driven
Approach, in DANIEL C. ESTY & MARIA H. IVANOVA, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE: OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 1, 7 (2002) [hereinafter Esty &
Ivanova, Revitalizing Governance]. The compliance problem in international law and
international relations is, of course, not limited to environmental obligations. See
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improve international environmental conditions to a "weak
institutional structure,"' poor international governance,5 a lack of
"transformational leadership," 6 and even an element of "management
shortcomings and bureaucratic entanglements."7 Most commentators,
in fact, would opt for "all of the above" as descriptive of the causes of
international environmental governance failure.8 Not all agree with
this dismal assessment,9 but for the present argument such criticisms
will be accepted as generally valid.
Another piece of conventional environmental wisdom ascribes
unusual coherence and enforceability to the system of international
economic law and policy symbolized by the monolithic World Trade
Organization (WTO)." Membership in the WTO requires adherence
to a complete array of trade agreements; compliance with those
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); Kal
Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and
Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et
al. eds., 2002).
4. Daniel C. Esty, The Value of Creating a Global Environmental Organization,
ENV'T MATTERS, June 2000, at 13.
5. Draft Report of the President of the United Nations Environmental
Programme Governing Council for Consideration by the Open-Ended
Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or Their Representatives on International
Environmental Governance, U.N. Environment Programme, UNEP/IGM/5/2 (2002).
6. JoY HYVARINEN & DUNCAN BRACK, ROYAL INST. OF INT'L AFFAIRS,
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONS: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 38
(2000).
7. Esty & Ivanova, Revitalizing Governance, supra note 3, at 1-2.
8. Esty & Ivanova, for example, declare that, "the current international
environmental regime is weak, fragmented, lacking in resources, and handicapped by
a narrow mandate." Id.
9. See, e.g., Environment and Trade No. 17: Policy Effectiveness and Multilateral
Environmental Agreements, U.N. Environment Programme, at 12 (1998) (asserting,
"[T]he actual functioning of [multilateral environmental agreements] are based on a
common and remarkably coherent set of principles, assumptions and underlying
notions of validity which are more important in shaping policy effectiveness than
geographic proximity or a centralized decision-making process.").
10. E.g., Esty, who states that the creators of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) "elevated the commitment to freer trade to a nearly
'constitutional' level" and noting the "focused mission" and "efficacy" of the trade
institutions. ESTY, GREENING, supra note 2, at 76-77. Since Esty wrote that, the
Agreement to Establish the World Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh, on April
15, 1994, not only elevated the old provisional organization of the GATT to full-
fledged international organization status as the WTO, but also integrated a range of
trade agreements into a "single undertaking" that must be accepted in toto by any
state joining the WTO. Furthermore, the WTO is becoming increasingly universal,
with a membership, as of October, 2003, at 148 countries or trade entities.
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agreements is monitored through periodic formal review of member
state conformity with their obligations." Claims by one member of
specific failures to comply by another member are subject to
resolution through a judicialized system of "dispute settlement" in
which one state can obtain a prompt, definitive ruling on its claim of
alleged breaches of the obligations by another state.12
From the twin propositions of weakness in international
environmental institutions and robustness in international trade
institutions, some have drawn the seemingly natural conclusion that
when environmental protection measures come into conflict with
international trade policy, trade norms will trump the environmental
norms.13 Because few openly applaud such an imbalance of priorities,
prominent policy makers (including heads of state and directors
general of the WTO) 14 as well as academic commentators15 have put
11. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Annex 3: Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
12. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes. Dispute settlement rulings are legally binding and ultimately enforceable
through a state's right to compensate itself in trade terms for the trade injury it has
suffered. The enforceability of its judgments has given WTO dispute settlement a
distinctive reputation for effectiveness. E.g., DAVID HUNTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1152 (2d ed. 2002) ("[Tlhe
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) establishes one of the most potent
dispute settlement systems at the international level.").
13. Wapner, supra note 1, at 8 ("[Wlhile the international community has created
an extensive system of international environmental regimes, this system has been
largely trumped by trade agreements."); Esty & Ivanova, Revitalizing Governance,
supra note 3, at 2 ("Absent a vibrant international environmental body, many
decisions with serious environmental repercussions are taken within the economic,
trade, and finance institutions, where short-term economic priorities often trump
long-term sustainability."); Government of Canada, International Environmental
Institutions: Where from Here? (2000) (asking rhetorically, "[i]s the [international
environmental institutional] machinery strong enough to counterbalance the
predominance of international economic institutions and shift the policy balance in
favour of sustainable development?").
14. A synopsis of the proposals offered by, among others, then director-general
of the WTO Renato Ruggiero, President Jacques Chirac of France, and jointly by the
governments of Germany, Brazil, Singapore, and South Africa, can be found in Dena
Marshall, An Organization for the World Environment: Three Models and Analysis,
15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 79 (2002). See also, HYVARINEN & BRACK, supra note
6, at 59 (recapitulating the Ruggiero and Chirac proposals and others by German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Laura Tyson (adviser to President Clinton) and
presidential candidate Al Gore); Frank Biermann, The Option of a World
Environment Organization, in THE ROAD TO EARTH SUMMIT 2002, at 51 (2001)
(adding to the above an expression of support from the current director general of
the WTO, Supachai Panitchpakdi).
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forward the idea that the world community should create a more
robust international environmental organization-sometimes styled a
Global Environmental Organization (GEO)' 6 -to act as a
counterpart, and counterweight, to the WTO.17
The continuing degradation of international environmental
conditions is undeniable 8 and cries out for a concerted response. The
15. The most prominent academic proponents have been Daniel C. Esty (see
Esty, supra notes 2, 3, and 4); C. Ford Runge (see C. Ford Runge, A Global
Environment Organization (GEO) and the World Trading System: Prospects and
Problems, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 399 (2001) [hereinafter Runge, Prospects and
Problems]; see also, C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT:
BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS (1994)
[hereinafter RUNGE, FREER TRADE]); and Frank Biermann (see Biermann, supra
note 14; see also, Frank Biermann, The Emerging Debate on the Need for a World
Environmental Organization: A Commentary, 1 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
45 (2001)).
16. GEO is originally Esty's term, and is used here to refer to any organizational
proposal that has a similar focus on enhanced organizational authority, policy
integration and coordination, information sharing and capacity building. Runge
originally called his proposal a World Environment Organization (WEO), but he has
more recently adopted the term GEO. Steve Charnovitz favors WEO over GEO as
the preferable moniker. Steve Charnovitz, A World Environment Organization, 27
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323, 330-31 (2002). A British-Canadian team of economists has
proposed a variant, which they also call a World Environmental Organization
(WEO). John Whalley & Ben Zissimos, What Could a World Environmental
Organization Do?, 1 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 29 (2001). This WEO is
conceived as a clearinghouse for transnational economic transactions involving
resources and their management. It is thus not directly apposite to the issues being
addressed in this Article, and will therefore be given less attention. See infra note 19.
17. ESTY, GREENING, supra note 2, at 77 ("The lack of an institutional structure
to protect the environment the way the [WTO] guards free trade lies at the heart of
the antagonism between trade and environmental interests."); Runge, Prospects and
Problems, supra note 15, at 399 ("A GEO should be considered as a possible step [in]
coordinating international environmental policy, whilst protecting and insulating the
World Trade Organization (WTO) from responsibilities for which it is both
disinclined and unprepared."); Biermann, supra note 14, at 52-53 (arguing that a
world environmental organization could, for example, "elaborate internationally
acceptable environmental guidelines to be used for the activities of the World Bank
and the WTO dispute settlement system"); JOHN WHALLEY & BEN ZIssiMos, A
WORLD ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION? (Centre for the Study of Globalisation
and Regionalisation, Working Paper No. 63/00, 2002) (arguing that, "A [World
Environment Organization] ... can also counterbalance the institutional presence of
agencies in non-environmental areas, such as the World Trade Organization.").
18. The solitary skepticism of Bjorn Lomborg in this regard has been thoroughly
discredited by scientific and policy experts. Compare BJORN LOMBORG, THE
SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD
(2001), with, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Skeptical Environmentalist or Statistical Spin
Doctor?: Bjorn Lomborg and the Relationship Between Environmental Law and
Environmental Progress, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 263 (2002); Allen Hammond &
Emily Matthews, Faulty Scholarship: Lomborg and Earth's Living Systems, 53 CASE
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international trade regime, with its credible and oft-used enforcement
mechanisms, is indeed the most robust system of international
governance now operating. It does not follow, however, that trade
contributes significantly to world environmental problems or that
trade norms will always trump environmental norms when the two
realms interact.19 Even less so does it follow that the construction of
an integrated international environmental organizational structure
will help ameliorate trade's environmental effects or correct any
imbalance between trade and environmental norms. As Oran Young
has observed, "The mere establishment of governance systems...
offers no guarantee that they will prove effective solving the problems
that motivated their creation."2
This Article will critically examine the proposals to create a
GEO or WEO with particular reference to trade-environment policy.
It will argue that the creation of a global environmental organization,
though perhaps meritorious as a way to reinvigorate international
environmental management on its own terms, will not help
appreciably in solving the trade-environment problematique and may,
in some important respects, contradict deeper principles of liberal
international environmentalism. Seeing the continued resistance of
the WTO to environmental considerations as the central problem,
this Article proposes instead a renewed focus on efforts to bridge the
cultural gap between the worlds of environmental policy and trade
policy.
The argument has three parts. Part I of the Article will make the
case that the policy imbalance between trade and environment is not
as pervasive as it is often portrayed, even though there is a strong
tendency in the rhetoric of international trade theory and practice to
privilege trade policy over the potential benefits of trade-restrictive
W. RES. L. REV. 353 (2002).
19. For example, many environmentalists express a high level of concern that
trade measures embedded in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) will be
ruled impermissible under trade rules in a dispute brought before the WTO.
Heightening such anxiety, the WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment has
been unable to reach agreement, after a decade of deliberation, on a series of
principles or criteria by which to reconcile any conflict between an MEA and a
nation's trade obligations. Yet not a single dispute of this kind has ever been brought
to the WTO, and there are no signs that any country is inclined to precipitate such a
dispute.
20. Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Governance Systems, in
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 1, 3 (Oran
R. Young et al. eds., 1996).
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environmental protection measures. This is not to deny that there are
international governance problems in managing the trade-
environment interface, but rather to argue that governance reforms
may not appropriately address the more subtle and complex nature of
the real issues.
Part II of the Article will present and then critically evaluate the
basic arguments in support of a GEO as a counterpart to the WTO.
The analysis will focus on whether the GEO would effectively
compensate for the supposed comparative disadvantage of
international environmental policy relative to trade policy. Drawing
on some of the international relations literature, it will argue that the
needed reform, for trade and environment issues at least, is not one of
organizational counterpoise. Indeed, organizations, as such, have
little to do with the relative weakness of international environmental
law or the relative robustness of international trade law. Rather, the
matter is fundamentally one of relative political power at the national
as well as the international levels. The power disparity can only be
redressed by changed expressions of political will, primarily at the
national level.
Based on this analysis, Part III begins with the premise that a
concerted expenditure of political capital to establish a world or
global environmental organization as a counterpart the WTO will
have a counterproductive tendency to put environment and trade
norms in attitudinal and bureaucratic opposition to one another at the
international level. At the very least, a GEO may reinforce the
isolation of environmental experts and trade experts in their
respective organizational spheres. To be successful and to be true to
many of its fundamental principles, international environmental
policy ought instead to be more fully and deeply integrated into
economic policy in pursuit of sustainable development. In the final
analysis, trade policy will need to be adjusted to deal with
environmental considerations, and only the WTO can make those
adjustments. The better road to policy reform is to build bridges
between the two policy spheres and persist in the arduous process of
attitudinal change and policy integration, at the national as well as the
international level.
Finally, the Conclusion underscores that a focus on economic
and environmental policy integration at the international level means
that international governance begins at home. Domestic policy and
governance not only control the dominant share of the activities to be
managed but are also an important source of international law and
[Vol. 26:321
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the necessary vehicle for its implementation.
I. The Scope and Character of Trade Norm Privileging
I meant no harm. I most truly did not.
But I had to grow bigger. So bigger I got.
I biggered my factory. I biggered my roads.
I biggered my wagons. I biggered the loads
of the Thneeds I shipped out. I was shipping them forth
to the South! To the East! To the West! To the North!
I went right on biggering... selling more Thneeds.
21And I biggered my money, which everyone needs.
To the considerable extent that proposals for a global
environmental organization are advanced or endorsed as a means to
prevent trade norms from "trumping" environmental norms,
evaluation of the proposals must begin with a clear understanding of
the potential for, or reality of, such norm privileging. This Part
reviews key elements of the analysis of this complex question that
governments, advocates, and academics have developed in the last
ten years. My modest objective is to put the norm privileging
problem in perspective without attempting to resolve it.
In the classic discussions of trade-environment policy,22 trade
norms and environmental norms are understood to interact at three
different degrees of concreteness, and thus there are three conditions
under which trade norms might assume a privileged status. First, in
their most abstract form, trade norms might conflict with
environmental norms in theory. In this case, the question of which set
of norms dominates would assume "constitutional" importance, and
would probably be resolvable only by fundamental value changes in
societies around the world. Section A, below, addresses this aspect.
Second, trade in its most concrete manifestation-what is traded, how
much, and by whom-might have significant or unacceptable
environmental consequences. In such cases, trade might need to be
reduced or controlled in order to protect the environment. Section B
briefly takes up this issue.
The third and most complex trade-environment interaction arises
21. In the spirit of the symposium, titled "Lex & the Lorax: Enforcing
Environmental Norms Under International Law," this quote and the ones at the
beginning of the other parts are from DR. SEUSS, THE LORAX (1971).
22. E.g., ESTY, GREENING, supra note 2; TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND POLICY (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993).
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in the arena of legal norms and policy objectives, which are ultimately
expressed in formal texts. Section C explores this policy terrain.
Resolving these kinds of conflicts would be a matter of bargaining
over adjustments to the expressed norms, bringing institutional and
organizational factors to the fore as important considerations.
Almost all of the debate in the past decade has focused on this policy
aspect of the trade-environment interaction, such as the criteria for
deciding when a direct physical effect of trade might render trade
restrictions acceptable, and if so whether that decision may be made
nationally (unilaterally) or only multilaterally.
The GEO proposals posit that there is no conflict in principle
between trade and environment, but that the policy relationship
between the two needs to be better managed so that governments will
remain free to take environmentally appropriate actions to deal with
the concrete problems from trade when they arise. In other words,
the proposals suppose that there may be situations in which trade
should be reduced or controlled to protect the environment, and that
a GEO can assist the WTO (and share the political burden with it) in
identifying those situations and agreeing on the appropriate rules and
procedures for imposing the trade controls. The GEO proposals also
assume, more or less explicitly, that an identifiable and discrete set of
trade-environment policy conflicts will continue to arise, and
presuppose the theoretical preferences and responses on the part of
trade policy-makers and environmental policy-makers based on past
experience and stated viewpoints.
But if trade-environment policy tensions persist over time they
are likely to change character. Thus, the analysis should consider a
fourth dimension, the political dynamic of the interaction between
trade and environmental policy. Section D below will emphasize the
political and social as well as the economic context of these trade-
environment conflicts as influences on national governments and
international organizations.23 In this light, the question is not just
whether a GEO would solve the problems of today, but whether it
would be effective in integrating economic and environmental goals
to avoid the problems of tomorrow. In other words, could a GEO
introduce environmental principles and goals into the world trade
policy process and bring economic concepts more fully into
23. For a similar perspective, see Chantal Thomas, Trade-Related Labour and
Environmental Agreements?, 2002 J. INT'L ECON. L. 791 (repeatedly mentioning the
need for political will to make policy reforms on these issues).
[Vol. 26:321
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environmental policy-making, so as to advance the world's
sustainable development interests in both trade and environmental
policy?
A. Do Trade and Environment Conflict in Principle?
The U.N. Conference on Environment and Development
asserted that trade and environment policies can and should be
mutually supportive.24 The world's trade ministers agreed that "there
should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction between
upholding and safeguarding an open, non-discriminatory and
equitable multilateral trading system on the one hand, and acting for
the protection of the environment, and the promotion of sustainable
development on the other."25  Numerous commentators, including
Esty and Runge, leading proponents of the GEO, have pointed to the
many ways in which the free exchange of goods and services between
countries dovetails with fundamental precepts of environmental
protection, including greater economic efficiency (which promotes
conservation of natural resources and minimization of waste), mutual
support of the polluter pays principle, and a common interest in
removing environmentally harmful subsidies, which also distort
trade.26
The standard and generally appropriate response to these
favorable synergies between trade and environment has been to note
that while trade, per se, may be environmentally neutral, the
environmental policies observed by trading partners can allow or
even encourage environmentally destructive behavior by firms
24. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (1992) (Principle 12: "States should cooperate to promote a
supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic
growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems
of environmental degradation."); Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vols. 1, 11,
& III) (1992) (Chapter 2, 9 2.19: "Environment and trade policies should be mutually
supportive.").
25. Decision on Trade and Environment, April 14, 1994,
MTN.TNC/MIN(94)/1/Rev. 1, at 4. This was the ministerial decision that established
the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment and set forth its terms of reference.
26. ESTY, GREENING, supra note 2, at 65-71 (presenting and generally endorsing
the view that implementing the polluter pays principle and better cost internalization
reconciles trade and environment policy goals); RUNGE, FREER TRADE, supra note
15, at 114 ("In summary, the welfare effects of liberalizing trade are ambiguous if
environmental externalities are left uncontrolled; but if they are largely internalized
by an appropriately targeted environmental policy, the joint 'liberalization effect' and
,environmental effect' on welfare is positive.").
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engaged in international commerce. A sound relationship between
trade and environment, much less a "mutually supportive" one, does
not happen automatically, but will come about only if trading
partners also pay close attention to related environmental policies.
That does not negate the first point, however, which is that there is
nothing intrinsically hostile to the environment in the exchange of
goods, services, and investments across national boundaries.27
Environmentalists who favor a local community orientation in terms
of providing food and other goods and services might take issue with
that claim, but theirs is fundamentally a social and ethical viewpoint
about what works best for the environment, not a claim that exchange
with foreigners is intrinsically damaging to the environment.
B. Environmental Harms from Trade
The second dimension of the trade-environment relationship is
the physical consequences of trade itself. In a direct sense,
transactions in trade have no environmental consequences apart from
the transport installations and operations that are involved in moving
goods from one country to another.2 Looking at the broader regime
of liberalized international exchange that is the essence of the modern
global economy, trade activity itself has more significant
environmental consequences arising from the physical content of the
goods being traded, taking into account the way the goods were
produced and the way they are used. As noted economists remarked
over a decade ago, "[a]lthough many positive things can be said about
liberalizing and thus increasing trade, the structure of trade, as we
know it at present, is a curse from the perspective of sustainable
development."
29
27. Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the
Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 459, 471 (1994).
28. Those effects are not trivial, to be sure (e.g., introduction of invasive species
through ship ballast water or aircraft; wetland or coastal habitat modification or
destruction for port facilities; and air pollution from in-port ship operations or
international trucking, among others), but they have not been the focus of concern
about trade-environment policy interactions. On the other hand, as repeated
controversies over waste management illustrate sharply, it may sometimes be
environmentally preferable to move something across a border than to try to acquire
it or manage it within a particular national territory.
29. Trygve Haavelmo & Stein Hansen, On the Strategy of Trying to Reduce
Economic Inequality by Expanding the Scale of Human Activity, in
ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING ON
BRUNDTLAND 27, 46 (Robert Goodland et al. eds., 1991).
[Vol. 26:321
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The environmental effects of what is traded are the integration of
three different aspects of trade: scale, composition, and distribution.
Scale refers to the ever-rising volume of international trade, which
represents an increasing scale of consumption worldwide that puts
stress on various environmental resources such as forests, fresh water
supplies, and fish stocks. °  Composition means that the
environmental effects associated with traded goods depend on just
which goods are being traded. Trade in petroleum entails one set of
consequences; trade in cotton another, trade in automobiles yet
another, and so forth. The third aspect, distribution, indicates that
who is trading with whom also matters environmentally. In
particular, current patterns of trade in natural resource commodities
such as fish, timber, and minerals, many of which are being extracted
from developing countries to feed high rates of consumption in
developed countries, are generating many of the environmental and
social stresses that are calling into question the legitimacy of the
entire trade system." One vivid example is oil. World Bank and
other studies demonstrate that investments by developing countries in
petroleum export tend to have negative consequences for economic
and political development despite the foreign exchange earned. 2
Another example that became politically salient at the 2003 Canctin
trade ministerial meeting is the environmental and economic effects
of agricultural subsidies in the United States and Europe on
agricultural producers in developing countries.
C. Trade and Environment Policy Conflicts
The third dimension of the relationship between trade and
environment-their policy interaction-is the most complex and
controversial. In particular, the effect of the trade regime on the
30. The ecological economist Herman Daly, in particular, emphasizes the scale of
economic activity as a key driver of environmental consequences. HERMAN E. DALY
& JOHN R. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING THE ECONOMY
TOWARD COMMUNITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 141-46
(1994).
31. Hilary F. French, Assessing Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries, in
STATE OF THE WORLD 1998, at 148, 153-56 (Lester R. Brown et al eds., 1998). COREY
L. LOFDAHL, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION AND TRADE 157 (2002)
(presenting an interesting systems-based analysis developing what he calls "trade-
connected GNP," which shows that "trade provides the mechanism by which the
costs of industrialization are pushed off by rich countries onto poor ones.").
32. Daphne Eviatar, Striking it Poor: Oil as a Curse, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at
B9.
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environmental protection that most worries policy entrepreneurs is
the perceived propensity for the international trade rules to constrain
environmental protection measures whenever those measures have
the effect of restricting or distorting trade in certain products. It is in
this context that trade policy is said to "trump" environmental policy.
There can be little disagreement that the international trade
regime tends to privilege trade norms over environmental norms
when the two come into conflict. This proclivity is most obvious in
the trade jurisprudence on the application of the general exceptions
provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
Article XX. Article XX purports to allow a nation to violate the basic
trade rules in the GAT if its trade restriction is meant to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health or to conserve exhaustible
natural resources. To the despair of many environmentalists, trade
adjudicators have repeatedly ruled against national environmentally-
based trade restrictions, unduly narrowing the broad scope of Article
XX by reading into it implied conditions on its use."
Notwithstanding the unfortunate Article XX jurisprudence,
environmental apprehension about the more general privileging of
trade policy norms is, in many respects, misplaced. In fact, there are
few circumstances in which the particular principles and rules of trade
come into conflict with national and international approaches to
environmental protection. To begin with, environmental protection
measures more often target actions than products, and as
international environmental law repeatedly declares, nations have the
sovereign right to determine their own environmental policies with
respect to actions occurring in their jurisdiction, provided only that
those policies do not result in harmful environmental effects outside
their jurisdiction.34 This notion of sovereignty is fully consistent with
trade norms, and is often invoked by developing countries in
33. Sanford E. Gaines, The WTO's Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A
Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 739,
752-60, 770-74 (2001).
34. This is the approach enshrined in Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment and reiterated in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio
Declaration (see infra at notes 165-66). It is an intriguing question, but one beyond
the scope of this article, whether such continued resort to Westphalian notions of
sovereignty is compatible with the realities of economic globalization and ecological
interdependence. See, e.g., Seiichi Kondo, Globalisation, Governance, and the G8
Summit, paper delivered at a conference on "Governing Globalization: G8, Public
and Corporate Governance," May 27, 2003, available at <www.g8.utoronto.ca/
conferences/2003/insead/inseadpapers/kondo.html> (visited Nov. 2, 2003).
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particular in their efforts to deflect environmental conditionality on
free trade in goods. For those environmental measures that target
products (by setting standards on the characteristics of the product or
limits on its use or its disposal) national measures that are applied
even-handedly to domestic products and imported products are also
fully accepted by trade rules.
The universe of environmental measures that may conflict with
trade law thus reduces to three types: measures that discriminate on
their face between domestic and foreign products; measures that,
although facially nondiscriminatory, may discriminate de facto; and
trade-restrictive environmental measures that are in fact not directed
at the product, but at an action that takes place outside the
jurisdiction of the nation imposing the trade restriction.
Environmental measures of all three types have been the subject of
trade disputes.
The first type of case is represented by the Superfund case in the
GATT.35 The United States imposed a tax on crude oil and
petroleum products to fund the cleanup of old waste sites, but it set
the rate for imported oil higher than the rate for domestic oil, which
the GATT panel readily determined was unjustified discrimination.36
Environmentalists have no complaint with that outcome. However, a
case that has drawn some criticism from the environmental
community is the so-called Reformulated Gasoline case (the first case
brought under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding). In that
case, the United States admitted the facially discriminatory aspect of
a regulation on gasoline adopted pursuant to the Clean Air Act but
argued that the measure was covered by the general exceptions of
GATT Article XX because the measure was necessary to protect
human health and conserve clean air quality.37 The WTO accepted
the U.S. characterization of the measure as one conserving air quality,
but ruled that the discriminatory treatment of foreign gasoline
refiners did not serve that purpose, and was therefore "arbitrary [and]
unjustifiable" contrary to the requirements of Article XX.3 Although
35. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain
Imported Substances, GATT B.I.S.D. (136th Supp.) at 34 (1987). The U.S. Congress
quickly adjusted the tax rates to make them equal for domestic and imported
substances.
36. Id. at 65.
37. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WTIDS2/AB/R, at 50-58 (May 20, 1996).
38. Id.
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the United States defended its rule in the WTO dispute settlement
proceeding, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency did not really
disagree with the WTO's view of the matter; it had proposed to
modify its rule to eliminate most of the discriminatory treatment of
foreign refiners but was prevented from making that a final rule
change by a congressional appropriations rider.39
The second type of case-the matter of de facto discrimination-
presents complex problems that defy simple policies. The U.S.
Supreme Court has wrestled with similar issues in deciding cases
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, also without being able to
prescribe simple decisional criteria.' °  In the most recent
environmentally-related de facto product discrimination case in the
WTO, the Appellate Body determined that the substitute materials
for asbestos in cement pipe, although they competed with asbestos in
the marketplace, were not "like" asbestos because of legitimate
regulatory concern about health effects of asbestos, and thus there
was no discrimination.4' This handling of the matter is hardly
indicative of a WTO eagerness to "trump" trade-related
environmental measures. Another de facto discrimination case in the
WTO, Beef Hormones,42 has been criticized by many environmental
commentators for its insufficient recognition of the precautionary
principle. A close reading of the Appellate Body report, however,
reveals an ample and sophisticated discussion of the precautionary
principle, and an appreciation that some version of it makes up the
fabric of general international law against which all WTO cases
should be decided. 3 There are many complex facts to the case that
39. EPA proposed changes to its final rule with respect to foreign refiners on
May 3, 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 22800. The appropriations rider appears in Pub. L. No.
103-327, 108 Stat. 2298, Title III, Environmental Protection Agency, Administrative
Provisions.
40. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on Domestic
Environmental Regulations, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES
FOR FREE TRADE? 59, 84 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) ("The
general problem we have addressed in this study has resisted the best efforts of the
Supreme Court (for over 150 years), GATT tribunals, international negotiators, and
a host of talented legal scholars.").
41. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, T 113-14 (Apr. 5,
2001).
42. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26 & 48/AB/R (Feb. 13,
1998).
43. Id. TT 123-124. In part, the Appellate Body determined that the WTO's
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are beyond the scope of this Article." This was not a case, however,
in which trade policy simply trumped environmental policy.
The third type of environmentally-based trade measure stands
out most saliently: trade restrictions imposed not because of a
concern about the product itself, but to regulate how it was made or
produced. Trade people call this the issue of "processes and
production methods," or PPMs. PPM-based measures are common
coin for environmental protection domestically. Technology-based
air emission and wastewater effluent standards, for example, focus on
environmental performance at the manufacturing facility and have no
direct bearing on the quality or characteristics of the products being
manufactured. Health or environment-based bans or limitations on
agricultural pesticides are also PPMs; only those regulations
regarding levels of pesticide residues on foods relate to the product
itself. Similarly, national controls on access to or production of coal,
timber, or other natural resources from public lands are PPM-based
measures that control the rate or method or location of the harvest or
extraction activity.
Although trade law allows national restrictions on particular
products for many purposes, including environmental protection, it
does not countenance restrictions on imported products that are
based on how the product was made when those PPMs have no effect
on the physical characteristics of the resulting product. This is
especially so when the environmental harm being reduced by the
PPM measure (which by definition is occurring outside the national
jurisdiction of the importing country) has no long-range global or
transboundary environmental effect. Thus, for example, it is
permissible under trade norms to require an imported automobile to
meet national tailpipe emission standards because such measures: a)
relate to the product itself; b) are applied equally to domestic and
imported products; and c) are meant to protect the national health
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement had a specific provision related to the
precautionary principle and that general customary international law could not be
applied to shape an interpretation of that provision at odds with the language of the
text itself. Id. 124. The Appellate Body, though, expressly declined to determine
whether the precautionary principle is an accepted principle in international law, an
approach, or an emerging norm. Factually, the Appellate Body also determined that
the European Union, after years of study, had identified no credible scientific basis
on which to invoke precaution in this case. Id. [ 198-200.
44. One is the substantial uncertainty about just what the precautionary principle
is or how it should be applied. See Christopher Stone, Is There A Precautionary
Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10790 (2001).
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and environment of the importing country. It is not permissible,
however, to restrict trade in automobiles on the basis of the
supposedly inadequate degree of control of air or water pollution
generated at the foreign factories where they were manufactured, or
any other supposed deficiency in the environmental law of the
producing country.45
Environmental commentators on trade policy often exaggerate
the extent to which the trade rule against PPM-based measures
impairs national or international environmental protection
programs.46 In particular, they often assume that differences in
environmental regulatory standards from country to country give
producers in low-standard countries a competitive advantage over
producers in high-standard countries. They then argue that the WTO
prohibitions on national measures to compensate for this competitive
discrepancy show the incompatibility of trade norms with
environmental norms. Numerous empirical studies, however, reveal
that the assumed competitiveness effect does not show up in the real
world, at least with respect to most manufactured products.47 Some
studies, in fact, are consistent with exactly the opposite effect, namely
that companies in developed countries, challenged by demanding
environmental standards, actually improve their competitive
performance compared to producers in developing countries. 8
As just described, much of the environmental commentary on
PPM trade measures and competitiveness focuses on the issue of
pollution control related to manufactured products. As reflected in
the WTO cases, however, the repeated and enduring PPMs policy
problem is trade measures that seek to control methods of harvesting
natural resources such as timber or, in more celebrated trade cases,
45. It should be noted that a domestic manufacturer is not barred from selling
automobiles if environmental violations occur at the automobile plant. The shrimp-
turtle and tuna-dolphin cases, where domestic fisherman might be barred from selling
their catch if they violate the turtle or dolphin protection requirements, are the
exception rather than the norm.
46. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking
Behind the Trade and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (2001). Cf. Sanford
E. Gaines, Processes and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for
Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 383 (2002).
47. I reviewed those studies in Sanford E. Gaines, Rethinking Environmental
Protection, Competitiveness, and International Trade, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 231
(1997).
48. This is the so-called "Porter Hypothesis," named after Harvard Business
School professor Michael Porter, its best-known proponent.
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tuna and shrimp.49 Without plumbing the depths of the trade policy
debate in this area, suffice it to say that in the matter of resources
management the WTO can be fairly accused of giving privileged
status to trade norms vis-A-vis environmental policy objectives
through a restrictive interpretation of GATT Article XX.5 ° Natural
resources PPM-based trade restrictions are a very important area of
conflict between trade and environment norms. Natural resources
protection is more and more the focus of concern for international
environmental protection, and the WTO's persistent reluctance to
create substantial space for environmental measures that may directly
or indirectly affect trade in some products is cause for substantial
concern. Even so, this is a circumscribed area of policy conflict that
does not, by itself, call for sweeping measures or organizational
reform such as creating a GEO.
In summary, the trade system's general hostility to unilateral
national actions that have the effect of giving domestic companies a
competitive market advantage over their foreign competitors fosters
the perception that the WTO norms are inimical to national and
international environmental protection. The Article XX
environmental cases in the WTO give credence to this perception, as
do the lackluster debates in the WTO Committee on Trade and the
Environment (CTE). In the CTE, developing country representatives
are usually the most vociferous in fending off possible "green" trade
protectionism. Trade policy makers have refused to resolve even the
relatively simple problem of reconciling WTO principles with the
trade-restraining measures contained in several international
environmental agreements. These actions reinforce the
environmentalists' conviction that trade policy-makers do not
understand environmental problems and are determined blindly to
maintain the hegemony of liberal economics. Empirically, though,
there is little evidence that international trade in itself is undermining
environmental protection efforts. 1 The perception that trade policy is
trumping environmental policy exaggerates the reality.
49. The same could be true with respect to agricultural products, but there are
other environmental problems with the current patterns of trade and rules regarding
trade in agriculture that overwhelm the potential concern with PPM-based measures.
50. Gaines, supra note 33.
51. See, e.g., Gaines, supra note 47; for a different analysis coming to the same
general conclusion, see Robert Paehlke, Environment, Equity and Globalization:
Beyond Resistance, 1 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 1 (2001).
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D. A Fourth Dimension: Sociopolitical Tensions
The analysis in the preceding sections reflects the traditional
characterization of the governance dilemma as "the WTO vs. the
environment." This static view of the policy conflict, however, makes
a caricature of deeper and more complex environmental/economic
and social/political tensions over the relationship between open
international trade and environmental protection. The persistence of
the trade-environment debate and the continuing-indeed
escalating-antipathy toward the WTO among many
environmentally-concerned people in civil society indicates that there
is a serious governance problem, perhaps even a crisis. The GEO
proposals thus deserve to be taken seriously as thoughtful attempts to
correct trade governance deficiencies. By the same token, however,
they should be critically examined to see if they respond to the
shifting social and economic context of the trade policy debate.
As an exemplar of the sociopolitical critique of trade policy,
Corey Lofdahl offers a fresh and disquieting analysis of deeper
environmental and economic consequences of current patterns of
world trade. 2 He applies "lateral pressure theory," a particular
systems-based variant of international relations theory, to the study of
the complex linkages between the natural and the social worlds and
between nations. 3  Using forest cover as an indicator of
environmental conditions, Lofdahl agrees that the traditional trade
economists win the debate about the environmental benefits of
liberalized trade if one measures welfare and environmental quality
in straight GNP terms, which are the data normally cited. 4 That is,
high income countries have more forest and countries with high
population growth (and lower per capita incomes) have less forest.
But undertaking a broader analysis to account for the contribution of
trade to GNP, Lofdahl concludes that the combination of high GNP
and high environmental quality that developed countries now enjoy is
the result of their ability to externalize much of the environmental
damage associated with their development to other countries through
trade. As he succinctly puts it, "trade provides the mechanism by
which the costs of industrialization are pushed off by rich countries
onto poor ones., 55
52. LOFDAHL, supra note 31.
53. Id. at 29-63.
54. Id. at 157.
55. Id.
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In the context of the increasing strife between developing and
developed countries over the shape of the WTO's current "Doha
Development Agenda,,16  Lofdahl's analysis has profound
implications. If he is right, the strategy of externalizing significant
environmental costs has worked for developed countries because they
have had developing countries available to provide the resources they
need and absorb the displaced environmental harms associated with
their extraction. The global effort to achieve sustainable
development, though, has the goal of raising GNP levels in
developing countries, and the trade-environment relationship must be
judged on the capacity of trade to promote sustainable development
broadly. Here the fundamental problem becomes apparent: the
possibility that developing countries will be unable to replicate the
development trajectory of the developed countries because they have
no place to externalize the environmental costs associated with their
own increased consumption of resources as they try to develop their
economies. In other words, international trade may have been
"mutually supportive" of environmental protection from the
perspective of the developed economies, but it may not be able to
operate in the same mutually supportive fashion for the developing
countries.
Though Lofdahl's analysis may not be completely valid as a
matter of rigorous economic analysis,57 it draws on and lends support
to a range of popular and politically powerful perceptions (or
misperceptions, as the case may be) that influence policy makers
today. These shifting perceptions account for the role reversal that
took place between Rio in 1992 and Johannesburg in 2002, with the
developing countries now in the forefront of expressing concern over
environmental conditions and the developed economies going to
some lengths to defend open market principles against environmental
conditionality. 8 Moreover, the trade policy grievances of developing
countries dovetail with the environmental questioning of the
56. The collapse of the 5th WTO ministerial conference in Canctin, Mexico in
September 2003 revealed the depth of the strife. See, e.g., Scott Johnson, The Poor
Get Poorer, NEWSWEEK (Pacific ed.), Sept. 29, 2003, at 42; Patrick Smith, Poor
Nations Keep Heat on Trade, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 30, 2003, at 6.
57. Among the methodological questions that arise is whether forest cover is a
suitable proxy for relationships in trade of natural resources. Substantial proportions
of tropical deforestation and temperate region afforestation are attributable to
demographic pressures and changing agricultural practices within countries, not to
trade in forest products.
58. Wapner, supra note 1, at 4-6.
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fundamental legitimacy of trade policy in an ecologically-limited
world.59
Politically, the deeper relationships between the liberal
economics of trade and environmental protection policy also present
contradictions. Bernstein makes a convincing case that, for the
present, the norm of liberal environmentalism dominates because,
through what he calls a "socio-evolutionary" process, environmental
governance has been linked to the broader normative framework of
liberal economics." He draws at least two lessons from this policy
evolution. On the one hand, "possible management regimes for
global environmental problems should be expected to occur within
the opportunities and constraints of liberal environmentalism."6 The
pattern of work in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) during the 1980s and early 1990s illustrates
this proposition. The OECD did substantial analytical work on the
benefits of using economic instruments (such as taxes, pollution
charges, and deposit/refund systems, to promote more effective and
flexible environmental protection programs at the national and
international levels. The OECD then drew on that liberal economic
approach in formulating its recommendations on trade and
environment issues in the 1990s. On the other hand, Bernstein asserts
that where solutions to environmental problems do not fit within the
liberal environmental norm, "international cooperation is likely to
remain difficult.,
62
In light of these difficulties, Bernstein faults recent work in the
rationalist tradition, exemplified by the GEO proposals, for "focusing
exclusively on issues of design, which most often take the goals
institutions pursue and the values they promote as given or
unexplained., 63 If the liberal economic paradigm, of which an open
international trade regime is an integral component, is fundamentally
flawed as an approach to sustainable development, the rationalist
59. See DALY & COBB, supra note 30, at 143-44. At the domestic level, Kysar has
raised similar questions by applying the macroeconomic perspective of ecological
economics to the debate over the interrelationship between economic and
environmental policy. See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the
Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2001); Douglas A. Kysar, Law,
Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675 (2003).
60. Steven Bernstein, Liberal Environmentalism and Global Environmental
Governance, 2 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 8 (2002).
61. Id. at 10.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 13.
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design proposals may miss the environmental mark. As Bernstein
puts it, simply accepting the liberal economic mind-set as a given
"truncates debate on... fundamental [normative] issues at the heart
of designing institutions to address global environmental problems."'"I
Bernstein advocates a different approach: "Rather than assuming a
well-designed institution is 'good' because it facilitates cooperation,
[a] focus on norms.., is a first and necessary step to assess what kind
of changes institutions are actually promoting and their potential
impacts on particular policies and outcomes."65 The GEO proposals
clearly eschew such a normative debate.
Princen, though, takes up Bernstein's challenge. He claims that
the "prevailing principles of social organization-cooperation,
efficiency, equity, sovereignty-are not up to the task" of "reversing
biophysical trends and getting on a sustainable path."66  These
principles fail to address "two defining characteristics of
contemporary environmental trends"-criticality (the fact that some
trends are leading to "critical" environmental problems, such as
species extinction) and exportability ("the increasing ease of
exporting the risks of critical threats and escaping responsibility for
their creation" by using international trade to acquire goods and
leaving foreign countries to bear the environmental harms from
producing them.)67  The notion of exportability dovetails with
Lofdahl's analysis, and puts into question the ability of the
international trade system, built on the foundation of efficiency and
cooperation, to accept controls on the export of risks arising precisely
from the medium of international exchange. As a restraint on
overconsumption," Princen prescribes new principles based on what
he calls "sufficiency"-as an antidote to efficiency-the recognition
that there can be enough (a sufficient amount) of an activity and the
corollary understanding that there can be too much of an activity. He
places some familiar principles of international environmental law
under his sufficiency rubric. In particular, he sees the precautionary
principle as a check on creating risks and the polluter-pays principle
as a way to make sure that those who create risks do not escape their
64. Id. at 14.
65. Id. at 13-14.
66. Thomas Princen, Principles for Sustainability: From Cooperation and
Efficiency to Sufficiency, 3 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 33, 34 (2003).
67. Id. at 40.
68. Rio Declaration Principle 8 calls on governments to "reduce and eliminate
unsustainable patterns of production and consumption."
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responsibility for them.69
Interestingly, we have already observed that the precautionary
principle is creating trade-environment policy frictions. Although the
polluter-pays principle (and its resource corollary, user-pays) is
normatively compatible with an open global market, its full and
vigorous implementation through international rules would require
major adjustment to the laissez-faire attitude toward economic
activity that underlies current trade principles. The ambivalent
attitude of the international community to the polluter-pays
principle-embracing it normatively but avoiding it as means of
implementing policy-exemplifies the political conundrum in
managing the trade-environment relationship. As Bernstein puts it,
liberal environmentalism, while giving credence to the idea that
international trade and sustainable development can be mutually
supportive, has made the trade-offs between "efficiency, economic
growth, corporate freedom, and environmental protection" more
difficult and thus "risks justifying inaction if tough regulatory choices,
which imply trade-offs with market values, are necessary to get the
desired ecological effects."70
The proposals to establish a GEO contain, as a key element of
their justification, the claimed need for a robust environmental
counterpart to the WTO on the international policy stage. In light of
the sociopolitical context of policy development explored by
Bernstein and Princen, it is an open question whether such a separate
environmental organization and its imagined dialogue with the WTO
could help resolve trade-environment tensions and formulate more
balanced trade-environment policies. The GEO proposals should not
be judged in terms of a simple trade policy/environmental policy
dichotomy. The proper and more demanding test is whether a GEO
is likely to contribute to a full-not truncated-and fruitful discussion
among all interested parties about the norms and goals to be pursued
in resolving the emergent political contradictions between trade and
environment.
II. A Global Environmental Organization as a Response to the
Privileging of Trade Norms
"I repeat," cried the Lorax,
69. Princen, supra note 66, at 43-48.
70. Bernstein, supra note 60, at 14.
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"I speak for the trees!"
"I'm busy," I told him.
"Shut up, if you please."
The proponents of a Global (or World) Environmental
Organization argue that it would correct several governance
deficiencies in international environmental management, and would
be a useful counterpart to the WTO. This Part will first present the
basic goals and features of the GEO or its variant, the Global
Environmental Mechanism (GEM). But as Oran Young urges,
persons concerned with governance need to "set aside our
preoccupation with structures of government" and accept "the
growing realization that the achievement of governance does not
invariably require the creation of material entities or formal
organizations."'" This Part will argue that the emphasis in the GEO
proposals on organizational arrangements misses-or
misapprehends-the fundamental governance problems. On
superficial organizational terms, after all, the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) is pretty much the equal of the
WTO!72 We obviously need to look deeper for the root causes of the
environmental governance crisis and for the elements that account for
the effective power of the WTO and the apparent weakness of
UNEP. After such a deeper look, doubts arise about the GEO
proponents' diagnosis of what ails international environmental
governance, or whether the kind of organization they dream of, even
with the mandate and the skill and the resources they would bestow
on it, would make a great improvement. Moreover, an initiative to
create a new international environmental organization would
confront the same objective realities about environmental
management weaknesses, economic development aspirations, and the
balance of political power within and among nations that have
hindered existing environmental organizations.73 Finally, even if
71. ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 14 (1994) [hereinafter YOUNG,
GOVERNANCE].
72. Based on information from the websites of UNEP and the WTO, the annual
budgets of the two organizations around 2001 were both in the neighborhood of $115
million, and UNEP had a staff of 740, compared to 550 for the WTO. (Keep in mind
that for both organizations a significant portion of the staff is translators.) UNEP has
several small regional offices in different parts of the world. The WTO has a single
location in Geneva.
73. Calestous Juma, The Perils of Centralizing Global Environmental
Governance, ENVT. MATTERS, Nov. 2000, at 13, 15 ("The assertion that consolidating
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formed as wished, a GEO would not be effective to resolve the trade-
environment relationship as its proponents intend.
A. The Global Environmental Organization Proposals
A number of commentators in the early 1990s put forward ideas
for new international environmental organizations," or, in one case, a
trade-environment organization." The most fully and persistently
developed proposals have come from Daniel Esty and C. Ford
Runge.
Professor Esty first proposed the GEO in 1994 in the cause of
"GATTing the greens," by which he meant steering
environmentalists away from fruitless efforts to reform the GATT
(now the WTO) from within, and instead orienting them to the
"possibility [of] restructuring environmental policy mechanisms and
establishing [a] parallel international environmental regime
alongside" the WTO.76 Esty saw the WTO as an effective device by
which the member governments overcome their separate political
failures to restrain self-defeating economic protectionism and thereby
existing international organizations and secretariats of conventions will result in a
stronger and more effective agency is based on a misunderstanding of how
international bodies function." . . . "The claim that a new agency would serve as a
counterweight to the WTO is fundamentally flawed."); Adil Najam, The Case Against
GEO, WEO, or Whatever-else-EO, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONS:
PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM 32 (Duncan Brack & Joy Hyvarinen eds., 2002)
("[O]rganisational structure is but one element [of the crisis in global environmental
governance] and, in this case, a relatively small element at that."); Konrad von
Moltke, Clustering International Environmental Regimes, in GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM 44 (Duncan Brack & Joy
Hyvarinen eds., 2002) (noting that "merger of existing international regimes is a
daunting task" that "does not appear feasible except in singular cases" and that this
argument applies "with greater force to any attempt to create a World Environment
Organisation.").
74. In addition to the Esty and Runge proposals discussed immediately below,
see Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 259, 279-80 (1.992) (advocating a new U.N. environmental agency with the
power to take binding decisions, modeled on the International Labor Organization);
Steve Charnovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23
ENVTL. L. 475, 513 (1993) (proposing an International Environmental Organization
to codify environmental trade rules and assist the WTO in ruling on environmental
trade measures, also using the ILO as a model).
75. Jeffrey Dunoff, Resolving Trade-Environment Conflicts: The Case for Trading
Institutions, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 607, 622-25 (1994) (advocating an organization
with both economic development and environmental protection in its mandate to
deal with trade-environment policy and dispute resolution).
76. ESTY, GREENING, supra note 2, at 75.
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attain the mutual collective action benefits of more open
international markets. Through its "established rules, norms, and
procedures," he suggested, the WTO defends the open global
economy from encroachment by national governments and their
domestic constituencies.77  He then argued that international
environmental law has "little structure and is marked by policy gaps,
confusion, duplication, and incoherence" and that there is no
organization to establish "broad GATT-like principles as the basis for
norms in international environmental relations."78  From these
observations, Esty concluded that "[t]he lack of an institutional
structure to protect the environment the way the [WTO] guards free
trade lies at the heart of the antagonism between trade and
environmental interests."79
Professor Runge, by his own characterization, "developed a case
similar to Esty's" for broadening the NAFTA's three-nation
Commission for Environmental Cooperation to a multilateral
organization." Runge, though, was more specific than Esty about
how such a GEO would be structured and what authorities it would
have. If the working staff part of the GEO would be a secretariat,
Runge foresaw that the secretariat's work would necessarily be
subject to the control of a ministerial-level council of the member
government representatives (just as the WTO secretariat gets policy
direction from a council of government trade officials). In Runge's
conception of the GEO, though, this council and the secretariat
would be advised, influenced, and assisted by what he called a
multilateral commission on environment. This commission would be
designed to draw on and benefit from the direct participation of
businesses, environmental groups, government experts, and
academics or others from the broader civil society.81 With his strong
interest in trade issues, Runge would have the GEO and its
"commission" focus on proposing ways to "'harmonize up' national
environmental standards." It would also issue regular reports and
recommendations on improved environmental policies, identification
of environmental "hot spots," and environmental projects to be
77. Id. at 77.
78. Id. at 78.
79. Id. at 77.
80. Runge, Prospects and Problems, supra note 15, at 404. Runge's initial
proposal appeared at about the same time as Esty's. See RUNGE, FREER TRADE,
supra note 15, at 100-07.
81. Runge, Prospects and Problems, supra note 15, at 404-06.
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undertaken by governments." Runge also specifically urged that the
GEO "work closely" with the multilateral development banks on
ways to finance environmental infrastructure projects for developing
countries, and "work jointly" with the WTO and the OECD "to
identify trade measures that threaten environmental quality, and to
develop environmental policies that are least burdensome to trade
expansion."83 As one of his main arguments in favor of a GEO,
Runge posited that, "[t]he overall effect would be to relieve the WTO
of major institutional demands to accommodate a 'green agenda."'' 4
Like Esty, he would redirect environmental advocacy toward the
"development of instruments directly aimed at environmental
targets.""
Esty's ambitions for the GEO are similar in spirit to Runge's, but
more sweeping and less specific. Part of Esty's premise is that, "The
presence of global environmental externalities, the public goods
nature of environmental programs, and the intergenerational trade-
offs inherent in environmental policy choices necessitate an
overarching regulatory structure." 6  Thus his GEO would have
multiple tasks: to cooperate on developing cost-internalizing
environmental regulations to avoid competitive disadvantage;8 7 to
make positive determinations of environmental obligations
(beginning with the definition of general environmental principles);88
and eventually to "add to the existing body of environmental law and
develop a cohesive set of norms, rules, methodologies, and
procedures for countries to follow in carrying out a shared
commitment to the protection of the planet."89 Finally, a GEO could
also support scientific understanding of environmental problems,
gather data, improve analytical tools and methods, evaluate the
effectiveness of environmental policies, promote the exchange of
information and the transfer of technologies, and "help broaden the
link between different international policy spheres," including trade
and environment.9
82. Id. at 404.
83. Id. at 406.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. ESTY, GREENING, supra note 2, at 79.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 80-81
89. Id. at 82.
90. Id.
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Recently, Esty and Runge have moderated their proposals and
refocused their arguments. Working with colleague Maria Ivanova,
Esty now favors a more modest and acronymically aesthetic GEM-a
"Global Environmental Mechanism."'" In this revised conception, the
GEM would promote '"collective action" through three functions: as
an information clearinghouse to help identify problems and track
trends; as a bargaining forum that would create a "policy space" for
environmental negotiation; and as an environmental technology
clearinghouse that would expand national and international capacities
for addressing issues.' Runge's latest paper emphasizes a soft version
of the GEO that would improve trade-environment policy
coordination by filling an "institutional gap," serve as an umbrella or
"chapeau" for the large and growing number of multilateral
environmental agreements, and provide independent expertise and
credibility in support of environmental policy principles and
objectives.93
A somewhat different perspective has been put forward in recent
paper by economists Whalley and Zissimos. They propose a WEO
that "departs sharply from recent calls for a WEO linked.., to the
trade and environment debate."'94  In their view, the trade-
environment debate "does not focus on central or substantive
environmental problems."9" They see the "central global
environmental problem" to be the "lack of internalization of cross
border and global externalities. '" 96 They promote their WEO not
simply as a counterbalance to the WTO (though the element
remains), but as an organization at "some distance from the WTO"
that will foster bargaining or exchange mechanism to promote the
internalization of cross border and global externalities.97
Finally, the most recent proposal from Charnovitz deserves
mention.99  Charnovitz canvasses all the earlier proposals and
synthesizes from them a World Environmental Organization with
structural elements of the ILO and of Runge's organizational model
and functionally geared toward policy coordination, influence over
91. Esty & Ivanova, supra note 3.
92. Id. at 12-13.
93. Runge, Prospects and Problems, supra note 15, at 407-13.
94. WHALLEY & ZIssiMos, supra note 17, at 1.100.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2.
98. Charnovitz, supra note 16.
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national environmental policies through work on environmental law
and its enforcement, and priority attention to the relationship
between economic and environmental policy.99
B. A Terminological Diversion-of Governance, Institutions, and
Organizations
To set the stage for analysis of the GEO proposals in terms of
trade-environment governance, a few matters of terminology need to
be clarified. The terms "governance," "institution," and
"organization" are often, but erroneously, used interchangeably.
Each term has its proper meaning; when used precisely, they
differentiate distinct, though related, elements of the overall issue.
Vogler identifies one part of this common terminological confusion
and its misuse: "The official and semi-official discourse on global
environmental change uses 'institution' as a synonym for
organization. However, in regime analysis, organizations and
institutions should not be conflated in this way."'" Najam points out
that the crisis of global governance "is one of 'governance'; of which
organizational structure is but one element......
Both Vogler and Najam cite the work of political scientist Oran
Young, who has devoted much of his work to international
environmental governance. Young offers a broad definition of
governance that also addresses the distinction between institutions
and organizations:
At the most general level, governance involves the establishment
and operation of social institutions (in the sense of rules of the
game that serve to define social practices, assign roles, and guide
interpretations among the occupants of those roles) capable of
resolving conflicts, facilitating cooperation, or, more generally,
alleviating collective-action problems in a world of interdependent
actors. There is nothing in this way of framing the issue that
presupposes the need to create material entities or organizations
(that is, governments) to administer the rules of the game that arise
to handle the function of governance.102
Governance, then, has as its objective the achievement of desired
99. Id. at 361-62.
100. John Vogler, Taking Institutions Seriously: How Regime Analysis Can Be
Relevant to Multilevel Environmental Governance, 3 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS 25, 25-26 (2003).
101. Najam, supra note 73, at 32.
102. YOUNG, supra note 71, at 15-16.
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social practices. In the case of international environmental issues,
governance seeks to change or eliminate behaviors that are
environmentally damaging and foster behaviors that will repair or
sustain the environment. Governance is made effective through
institutions in the sense defined by Young-as a set of substantive
norms, procedures, and social mechanisms. Institutions may provide,
for example, conceptions of property rights and interests for both
public and private property, the market system of economic
exchange, and a legal system that shapes and validates property
interests and market procedures.03
Governance is strong where the social institutions are capable of
legitimate norm formation, conflict resolution, cooperation, and, for
environmental purposes especially, overcoming collective-action
problems. It is weak to the extent that it fails to fulfill, or only
imperfectly serves, these functions. Governance through a system of
social institutions is achievable without the assistance of any
government organization, as illustrated, for example, by the
development of eco-labeling standards and environmental product
certifications by autonomous nongovernmental committees of
experts. Young therefore asserts that "the burden of proof must
always lie with those who argue that the achievement of governance
requires the establishment of a government.'1°4
To be clear on these terminological distinctions, the explanations
and justifications offered in favor of a GEO or GEM do, in Young's
terms, stress governance and institution-building and give relatively
little attention to the strictly organizational aspects of the proposals.
Esty and Ivanova, for example, summarize the GEM in terms of three
"core capacities"-provision of information and analysis, creation of
space for negotiation and bargaining, and building up capacity to
address environmental issues. °5  They explicitly identify
"information," "policy space," and "action mechanism" as
"governance functions. '' 1°  These three functions or capacities
conform closely to Young's emphasis on institutions that resolve
103. Najam, supra note 73, at 33. Vogler, supra note 100, quotes Douglass North
with a similar definition of institutions, including the observation that "'[i]nstitutions
are the rules of the game in society or, more formally, are the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction.... [T]hey structure incentives in human
exchange, whether political, social, or economic.'
104. YOUNG, supra note 71, at 16.
105. Esty & Ivanova, supra note 3, at 1.
106. Id. at 12.
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conflicts (information and policy space), facilitate cooperation (all
three), and overcome collective action problems (again, all three).
In the final analysis, however, the GEO proposals are
inescapably organizational. They rest on the argument that better
environmental governance can only come through a new organization
that will bring the desired level of normative coherence, institutional
capacity for management and coordination, and sociopolitical gravitas
to environmental policy and its interplay with trade policy and
economic development. Although Esty and Ivanova repeatedly stress
that they envision a "loosely structured GEM,"1 °7 and "not a new
international bureaucracy,"'0'8 they cannot do without a "light
institutional superstructure" with a staff "comparable in size and
expertise to the WTO Secretariat."'0'9 Runge, who has thought more
specifically about how a GEO might be structured, also suggests a
secretariat as a major element, suitably supplemented by an open,
transparent, commission involving environmental organizations,
businesses and others directly in the GEO's work. "° Although they
underplay the authority of the GEO to make legally binding
decisions, they would presumably agree with Geoffrey Palmer that
the GEO should be an organization with the power to act, not merely
another forum for discussion." '
To his credit, Esty anticipated the important arguments against a
new international organization from the beginning and acknowledged
that they raised "serious issues...... His own answers to them,
however, are rather general and ultimately fall back on the circular
proposition that a new organization is needed because the existing
organizations are not functioning effectively."3 I agree with Najam
that this circularity "has the effect of trivializing global environmental
governance" because its focus on "organizational tinkering" implies
that the "'institutional will'... for global environmental cooperation
already exists and all that remains is to set up an appropriate
organizational framework."..
To be sure, effective international environmental governance is
107. Esty & Ivanova, supra note 3, at 17.
108. Id. at 1 (emphasis in the original).
109. Id. at 17.
110. Runge, Prospects and Problems, supra note 15, at 404-06.
1.11. Palmer, supra note 74.
112. ESTY, GREENING, supra note 2, at 89-90.
113. Id. at 90-98.
114. Najam, supra note 73, at 33.
[Vol. 26:321
The Problem of Enforcing Environmental Norms in the WTO
inconceivable without an organizational infrastructure. Some
organization is needed to assist with the necessary administrative and
regulatory functions, most of which are beyond the capacity of
individual nations or the entities that exist for the general
coordination of international relations,"5 and are too intimately
concerned with public goods problems to be left entirely to private
enterprises or self-regulation mechanisms. Nevertheless, the GEO
advocates themselves give voice to complaints about treaty
proliferation and treaty congestion and the incoherence seen, for
example, in the overlapping mandates of UNEP and the U.N.
Commission on Sustainable Development."6 It is thus appropriate to
put the GEM and GEO proposals to Young's burden of proof: Why
is a new organization, even a "light" one, needed to achieve the
identified governance functions or to provide the identified
governance capacities?
C. Will a GEO Remedy the Trade-Environment Governance
Problem?
For the sake of the current argument, let us accept the basic
premise of the GEO proposals that the existing international
environmental organizations are incapable of inspiring, establishing,
facilitating, or overseeing the necessary institutional changes, which is
to say changes to the legal and social incentives for human behavior
toward the environment. We still need to inquire what circumstances
or obstacles have rendered the existing organizations so ineffective,
and to determine whether a new organization can escape those
circumstances or vault over those obstacles. With particular
reference to trade and environment, why is "the international
environmental status quo.., not working"?. 7 Would a GEO achieve
better governance? The analysis that follows will draw on Oran
Young's work on the institutional dimension of environmental
change. Young identifies three key problems in institutional design:
fit; interplay; and scale."'
115. See, e.g., Dunoff, supra note 75.
116. ESTY, GREENING, supra note 2, at 78; Esty & Ivanova, Revitalizing
Governance, supra note 3, at 3-5; Runge, Prospects and Problems, supra note 15, at
411.
117. ESTY, GREENING, supra note 2, at 90.
118. ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE: FIT, INTERPLAY, AND SCALE (2002) [hereinafter YOUNG, INSTITUTIONAL
DIMENSIONS].
20031
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The matter of fit is based on a simple proposition: "An
institutional arrangement that performs perfectly well dealing with
one.., problem may be a dismal failure in solving other problems."" 9
A corollary to that proposition, especially relevant to the analogy
drawn between the WTO and a GEO, is that, "[i]n the absence of
systematic understanding of the problem of fit, it is tempting to
proceed by analogy and especially to assume that regimes that are
successful in one context will work well in other settings.'
20
Interplay describes the interactions between institutions dealing
with an issue of common or overlapping concern. Young specifically
identifies the trade-environment problem as an example of "linked
issues."' 2 ' The critical issues to consider in terms of interplay are the
proper roles of the interacting institutions and which institution or
organization has the capacity to implement the preferred policy
reforms. There are two dimensions to interplay, horizontal and
vertical. For the trade-environment problem, horizontal interplay
would refer to the relationship between the WTO and the proposed
GEO. Vertical interplay would include the resulting relationships
between the international regime and the national governments
responsible for implementing it. For example, many trade policy
makers express anxiety that customs officials or national trade
officials lack the capacity to handle the complex administrative
demands that trade-related environmental measures might impose on
them.'22 Environmental policy makers also can confront capacity
problems or incompatibilities between national and international
law. 
123
Finally, the problem of scale encompasses the elements of space
and time. The variable geographic scale of different environmental
problems-some local, some regional, some global-means that
governance regimes need to be appropriate to the physical scale of
119. Id. at 20.
120. Id. at 22.
121. YOUNG, GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, at 24-26.
122. See YOUNG, INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 118, at 98-99 (discussing
this aspect of interplay as the matter of competence, compatibility, and capacity in
terms of the vertical interplay between international and national regimes).
123. E.g., John H. Knox, The Myth and Reality of Transboundary Environmental
Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 291 (2002) (showing that U.S. policy toward
international agreements on environmental impact assessment has been substantially
constrained by the policy of the State Department not to accept any international
obligation that goes beyond the parameters of the domestic National Environmental
Policy Act).
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the issue. Temporal scale refers to the long lag times associated with
environmental problems as diverse as toxic chemical contamination
and climate change, which call for institutional responses different
from those suitable for problems that have more immediate effects.
1. Does a GEO Fit the Governance Problem?
Three intended functions of a GEO are: 1) to bring greater
coherence to the principles underpinning national and international
environmental protection; 2) to coordinate the disparate agencies and
international agreements that make up the current environmental
regime; and 3) to enhance the level of information about and
scientific understanding of environmental conditions. In each of
these respects, GEO proponents invite comparison of a relatively
messy and enervated international environmental regime with the
tidy and energized WTO as guardian of and advocate for liberal
international trade. In the context of the "fitness" of the GEO for the
environmental regime, what accounts for the relatively messy nature
of international environmental law? Does a GEO "fit" as a way to
solve those problems?
There is also a practical side to the matter of fit. "[M]ost of the
institution-building in response to global environmental concerns has
occurred within the confines of traditional sovereign-state
diplomacy.' 24  Barring revolutionary changes in the entire world
order that are not in prospect, building international governance
regimes that have authority to bind governments will continue to be a
task for nations. For global environmental governance, that means
gaining the agreement of most of the nearly 200 nations of the
world.25 In their international actions, nation states seek to establish
advantage for national interests, or at least avoid institutional or
substantive disadvantage. They are not inclined to bold institutional
reforms. As Bernstein puts it, "new ideas must find some 'fitness'
with the existing international social structure.' 26  Such a realist
124. Bernstein, supra note 60, at 10.
125. In the discussion of scale in section 3, infra, the possibility of regional
approaches to global problems will be considered. The GEO proponents take note
of regional governance mechanisms such as the European Union or the North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, but seek a multilateral
counterpart to address global issues. See, e.g., RUNGE, FREER TRADE, supra note 15,
at 101 (the CEC is a "prototype for the WEO" that should be extended "to the
multilateral level").
126. Bernstein, supra note 60, at 8.
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consideration, by itself, is an insufficient basis on which to criticize the
GEO idea. On the other hand, GEO proponents should at least
consider how the new organization would fit in the current
international framework.
a. The Historical Lack of WTO-Comparable Political Will
At the most mundane level of fit, it seems clear that the key
governance problem is that the international community simply lacks
the will to establish a GEO. Some GEO proponents optimistically
suggest that government attitudes about international governance can
change rapidly, noting that the idea of a World Trade Organization
also lacked explicit backing from governments only two decades
before they agreed to establish it."7 The WTO analogy is inapt,
however, because the circumstances of the evolution of trade
governance are markedly different from those that challenge
environmental governance. Historically, leading nations had the
intention to establish a full-fledged international trade organization in
the mid-1940s. The International Trade Organization failed to be
established at the time because an isolationist U.S. Congress refused
to give its consent, but the idea never lost its appeal in international
trade circles. Meanwhile, the GATT agreement was implemented
"provisionally" in 1947 without any agreed organizational
architecture. A system of internal procedures and a professional staff
gradually evolved over the years, but always on the same
"provisional" basis. The system for settlement of disputes also
evolved over the years with only ad hoc decisions by member
governments to support it. Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s, the
current organizational composition of what became the WTO was
almost fully developed, with a professional secretariat staff and
regular monthly meetings of a governing council of member
government trade officials. It lacked only two elements to make it
complete. On a formal level, the organization needed to emerge from
GATT's ambiguous provisional status into a fully-recognized and
chartered legal entity. Substantively, many member countries wanted
a more coherent and more clearly enforceable system for the
settlement of trade disputes, and were already working toward the
negotiation of a new "understanding" to further judicialize what had
127. Biermann, The Emerging Debate, supra note 15, at 54 (noting that "two
decades ago, the establishment of... a world trade organization appeared unrealistic,
too. It is time again to demand the impossible.").
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begun as a largely diplomatic negotiation approach to disputes among
the members. The last steps, from the situation in the mid-1980s to
the final agreement to establish the WTO in 1994, were thus small
ones in concept and in political consequence.
There is no comparable tradition of interest in or support for a
single governing environmental organization, and the response of the
world's governments in the last five years to the acknowledged crisis
in international environmental governance gives no cause to be
optimistic that support will coalesce around the "rational
institutionalist"'"8 proposal for a GEO, or even for the "new, forward-
looking, sleeker, and more efficient architecture" '129 of a GEM. In
1999, the U.N. General Assembly voted to create the Global
Ministerial Environmental Forum (GMEF).3 On the occasion of its
first meeting in 2000, the GMEF issued the Malm Ministerial
Declaration, in which the environment ministers called for a greatly
strengthened institutional structure for international environmental
governance.'31 This prompted the U.N. Environmental Programme
(UNEP) Governing Council (GC) in turn to form the Open-ended
Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or their Representatives on
International Environmental Governance (IGM). The result of the
ministers' work through the IGM process, finalized in early 2002 in
the preparations for the World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD) in Johannesburg, is a textbook example of international
diplomatic practice. It resonates with deep concern for the
environment and for the governance challenge, it probes and analyzes
the issues with considerable sophistication, and it reflects the diverse
views of governments on the major questions, with some developed
countries (especially European) repeating their calls for a new
environmental organization while the world's largest powers-the
United States, Russia, and China-expressed reservations.
Underneath their rhetoric, the ministers are vague about new
initiatives or implementing measures. They called for the
128. Bernstein, supra note 60, at 14.
129. Esty & Ivanova, Revitalizing Governance, supra note 3, at 19.
130. G.A. Res. 53/242, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/242 (1999).
131. U.N. Environment Programme, Global Ministerial Environment Forum,
Malm6 Ministerial Declaration, May 31, 2000, para. 24, available at <www.unep.org/
malmo/malmoministerial.htm> (visited Oct. 14, 2003) ("The 2002 conference should
review the requirements for a greatly strengthened institutional structure for
international environmental governance based on an assessment of future needs for
an institutional architecture that has the capacity to effectively address wide-ranging
environmental threats in a globalizing world.").
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institutionalization of their own role by making the "GC/GMEF" a
regular forum for discussion of the issues.'32 They called for
"strengthening the role, authority, and financial situation of UNEP"'33
(the existing institution that GEO proponents find ineffective). They
urged, in motherhood-and-apple-pie fashion, "improved coordination
to capture the synergies and linkages between the various
agreements," but reminded themselves that the "authority and
autonomy of the governing bodies [of international environmental
agreements] and the accountability of their secretariat [sic] to their
respective governing bodies should be respected."'34 The ministers
also took note that, "the ability of developing countries.., to
participate meaningfully in the development of international
policy.., and to undertake the requisite -implementation of
international agreements at the national level must be strengthened,"
the standard diplomatic appeal by developing countries for
technology transfer and for "new and additional" financial assistance.
Finally, they recommended the formation of a new entity within the
existing organizational framework, the Environmental Management
Group, to provide "enhanced coordination across the U.N. system."'35
The lack of specific action on this proposal for organizational
reform at the WSSD in Johannesburg later in 2002136 underscores the
formidable practical obstacle of getting a GEO adopted and
launched. More particularly, though, especially taken together with
the weak results of the WSSD, the lofty rhetoric of the IGM masks its
failure to accomplish anything of significance in terms of governance
reform. This failure clearly arises out of a lack of political will, at
least among a workable majority of nations, to reinvigorate their
132. Report of the Governing Council on the Work of its Seventh Special
Session/Global Ministerial Environmental Forum, Annex 1, Appendix: Report of the
Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or their Representatives on
International Environmental Governance, Governing Council of the U.N.
Environment Programme, UNEP/GCSS.VJI/6, 1 10, (2002).
133. Id. at heading III.B.
134. Id. $ 26.
135. Id. at heading III.E. 9 36.
136. The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.199/I.6/Rev.2, Sept. 4, 2002, 122(d), merely calls on the international
community to "fully implement" the IGM recommendations. Other paragraphs offer
specific recommendations on trade policy addressing trade and investment patterns
($1 123) and the need for better coordination between U.N. organizations and the
WTO ($$ 133-136). Accord, Vogler, supra note 100, at 25 (noting that the
Johannesburg Declaration makes "few specific proposals" on governance and
downplays the need for a new international environmental organization).
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commitments to the development and implementation of
international environmental policy.
b. The Current Lack of Political Will: Complexity and
Consequence
In thinking further about the "fitness" of a GEO to the widely-
perceived weaknesses of international environmental governance, it is
worth considering explanations for the lack of focused political will
even in the face of a long consensus list of serious environmental
problems. The lack of resolve undoubtedly has many explanations,
but I suggest that two factors sum them up-complexity and
consequence.
First, the enterprise to protect the world's environment is
daunting in its complexity. There are five hundred separate
multilateral environmental agreements"' precisely because there are a
multitude of discrete issues to be resolved, with little overlap among
them in terms of causes, effective remedies, affected interests, or
relevant technical and scientific skills. To take only a few prominent
multilateral agreements as examples, the protection of biodiversity
has essentially nothing in common with the management of
hazardous wastes, and neither has any relationship with the control of
the manufacture and use of ozone depleting substances. Even with
respect to fisheries, to take one more example, managing freshwater
fisheries and fish farming raises distinct questions from the many
issues relating to coastal and pelagic marine fisheries and coastal fish
farming. The tendency to develop separate organizational universes
to deal with these separate problems, which is characteristic of
national as well as international environmental governance, is natural
and should probably be applauded rather than bemoaned."' No
single umbrella organization could be an effective manager of so
many different regimes. As von Moltke puts it: "The environment is
too important to be left to a single agency."'39 The complexity factor
puts into question whether the world would really benefit from the
137. The precise count varies from source to source. Wapner, supra note 1, at 6,
puts it at "close to 500."
138. Konrad von Moltke proposes "clustering" as an intermediate process to
promote integration among similar regimes without striving for overall merger. Von
Moltke, supra note 73, at 44.
139. Konrad von Moltke, The Organization of the Impossible, 1 GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 23, 24 (2001).
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proffered policy coordination function of a GEO.'4 °
Complexity also refers to the inherent complexity of most
individual environmental problems. The challenges are familiar: our
scientific understanding of the environment is imperfect, it changes
over time, and its application to policy is contingent on both scientific
and social judgment. '  Environmental data are sparse or non-
existent, especially over periods of time adequate to make
assessments of changes in environmental conditions. Assessment
methodologies are subject to debate, as are criteria about what policy
decisions to make in the face of irreducible uncertainties. Policy
analysis requires sophistication across a range of disciplines. Such
complexities prevent ready agreement on either the nature and
criticality of specific environmental problems or the appropriate
degree or type of policy response to impose, if any. Ultimately,
politics in the broad sense, meaning the application of social values
and preferences, is inescapable.'42
Consequence is the second factor explaining the weak
international response to a GEO type of organization.
Environmental policy has important and wide-ranging consequences,
implicating in the end almost every facet of human endeavor.
Environmental regulation touches on all aspects of economic activity,
from individuals and households to private industry and agriculture to
public transportation and resource management and public and
private uses of land and water. There are multiple, non-obvious
trade-offs to be made between environmental quality objectives and
the economic consequences of trying to achieve them, trade-offs that
may appropriately vary from nation to nation and from one
environmental issue to another. Difficult issues and choices arise
with respect to the environmental costs or benefits of various
140. Imagine, for example, that the United States had accepted the advice of some
commentators and put all environmental policy under the control of a single agency.
Is it reasonable to believe that the Fish and Wildlife Service or the Forest Service
would be more effective or more environmentally oriented if grouped in the same
agency as the Superfund program and safe drinking water regulation, or vice-versa?
141. In the domestic context, Adam Babich has recently made the ironic
suggestion that there is "too much science" in environmental law. His point is that
scientific progress has "exposed the bankruptcy of attempts to base environmental
quality standards on pseudo-scientific evaluations of the risk[]," but that "truly
scientific answers about risk are unavailable." Adam Babich, Too Much Science in
Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 125 (2003).
142. The political scientist William Ophuls memorably observed twenty-five years
ago that for environmental problems, "There is no escape from politics." WILLIAM
OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1977).
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technologies, the effectiveness or suitability of different policy
mechanisms, and the size and skill of the administrative and legal
entities required to make environmental policy effective.
Governments are naturally and properly'43 reluctant to empower
an international organization to make, or even to significantly
constrain, their national environmental and economic policy choices
absent agreement in advance, through the negotiation of a specific
multilateral instrument, about the specific environmental problem
and the specific approach to be taken in addressing it. Indeed, to
yield substantial authority to an international organization might
engender complaints from the environmental community itself along
the lines of their sharp criticism of the remote WTO for its supposed
power to make decisions affecting local or national policy choices.
2. The Interplay Between a GEO and the WTO
Referring to the period between Stockholm and Rio, Bernstein
argues that
policy entrepreneurs, working through the OECD and Brundtland
commission, succeeded best at moving a concern for the
environment into the mainstream of international politics when
they nested environmental norms into the broader international
social structure, even as that structure evolved to reflect new
consensus on a liberal economic order."
It should be recalled, for example, that the polluter-pays principle,
now widely endorsed as a fundamental principle of international
environmental policy, began life as an economic principle dealing
precisely with the risk that environmental protection might distort
liberal international trade. From this engagement of
environmentalists with the economic order and their effort to benefit
from it and work within it came today's dominant, if faltering,' 6
143. In their environmental policies, most federal systems of government observe,
in one way or another, the principle of subsidiarity-the delegation of decisional
responsibility and authority to the lowest level of government that can effectively
manage the particular issue. Even when broad goals are set at the national or
international levels, detailed implementation is typically delegated to more local
entities. See related article in this issue, Armin Rosencranz, The Origin and
Emergence of International Environmental Norms.
144. Bernstein, supra note 122, at 8.
145. Sanford E. Gaines, The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to
Environmental Ethos, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 463 (1991).
146. It is not merely a coincidence that Esty is a leading skeptic about sustainable
development as a guiding principle. Daniel C. Esty, A Term's Limits, FOREIGN
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paradigm of sustainable development. The GEO proposal springs
from this tradition, with its appealing notion that if environmentalists
could only learn to focus their arguments and agree on some
universal principles, they could engage the WTO mano a mano in a
constructive dialogue that would lead to trade policy reforms.
One question about the interplay between the trade and
environment policy realms is whether the liberal environmentalism
implicit in the GEO is suited to the global governance challenges of
the 21st century. Further pursuit of the strategy by which
environmentalists learned to speak to the "power" of the dominant
liberal economic norm carries the danger that Bernstein identified of
"truncating" a more fundamental debate over the economic norms
themselves. "7 To use Princen's terminology, a world economic order
built on principles of sufficiency, such as precaution and transnational
cost-internalization, would need a much different set of rules from the
current system built on conventional principles of efficiency,
cooperation, and national sovereignty."' It is simply too much to
expect that any inter-governmental organization, especially one of
global scope, would become a vehicle for pressing the needed
normative debate. On the contrary, a GEO that spoke in terms of
ecological economics rather than conventional economics would
validate the fears of the WTO community that bringing
environmental considerations into trade policy threatens the world
economic order, and the WTO would therefore continue to
marginalize that point of view. After all, nothing compels the WTO
to engage in a dialogue with a GEO. On the contrary, the notion has
been that the WTO would welcome a GEO as a credible forum to
which traders could direct environmentalists and thus rid themselves
of the trade-environment albatross.
Hence an interplay dilemma: If the GEO were to stay within the
liberal policy mainstream, which would be the expectation for an
intergovernmental organization, it would perpetuate governance
failure by not engaging the trading system in the necessary normative
debate over values and trade-offs. But if it were by some miracle to
operate outside the mainstream rather than within it, the GEO would
quickly lose influence in the interplay with the WTO, the World
Bank, and other international economic organizations. In short, the
POLICY, No. 126, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 74.
147. See text at note 64, supra.
148. See text at note 66, supra.
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real governance problems lie with the paradigms of the economic
system. Governance remedies should therefore be targeted at the
WTO, not the environmental organizations.
Given the argument that the environmental community needs a
GEO to serve as a unified organizational counterpart to the WTO, it
is ironic that much of the support for the GEO comes from the trade
community itself. It cannot be mere coincidence that past and current
directors general of the WTO have publicly endorsed the creation of
a new environmental organization. Von Moltke surmises that the
debate over a GEO
has its origins in the frustration of those responsible for trade policy
[at] being confronted by an ever-growing list of environmental
concerns relating more or less directly to trade.... For trade
officials.., the multitude of international environmental
regimes ... are a source of dismay.149
Confronted with environmental issues within their jurisdiction,
feeling ill-equipped and uncomfortable in dealing with them, and
finding that their resolution of disputes that inescapably came their
way threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the entire trade regime
worldwide, trade policy leaders naturally look for counterparts who
can assume responsibility for these questions from the environmental
perspective. Runge, an academic trade expert, articulates just this
rationale for a GEO.'5 ° The obvious risk in terms of interplay is that
the WTO community will evade the difficult choices facing it and
simply dump the trade-environment problem in the lap of the GEO,
or blame the policy impasse on the recalcitrance of its environmental
counterpart.
Von Moltke is only partly right, though, in identifying frustrated
trade policy makers as the source of proposals for the GEO. The
most active GEO publicists, Esty and Biermann, come from the
environmental community. They believe that the environmental
community neither can nor should try to take the WTO by storm.
1 5 1
149. Von Moltke, supra note 139, at 23.
150. "A GEO should be considered as a possible step coordinating international
environmental policy, whilst protecting and insulating the [WTO] from
responsibilities for which it is both disinclined and unprepared." Runge, Prospects
and Problems, supra note 15, at 399).
151. The gist of Esty's "GATIing the greens" idea is the "largely overlooked ...
possibility that restructuring environmental policy mechanisms and establishing a
parallel international environmental regime alongside the GATI offers a more
sound basis for protecting environmental values than does 'greening' the GATT."
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They are willing to exonerate the WTO from full and direct
responsibility to solve the trade-environment problematique, but only
if they can replicate the WTO within the environmental policy world.
Yet as noted above, on strictly organizational terms UNEP is already
in the same league with the WTO. The two organizations have
budgets of the same general scale (around $100 million per year), and
staffs of similar size (300-400). Obviously, we need to look beyond
numbers of staff and size of budget to understand the interplay
between the two. The policy-relevant issues of coherence,
coordination, and information are offered by GEO proponents as
elements of a framework for that comparison. The first two-
coherence and coordination-are useful factors to consider in terms
of the interplay between trade and environment. '52 In the final
analysis, though, we need to refer to another factor that the GEO
advocates do not mention: political power.
a. Coherence
GEO proponents find the current policy structure of
international environmental governance incoherent, in contrast to the
relatively strong agreement in the world trade community on a few
core policy principles. Fundamentally, the fact that international
trade is the aggregation of discrete transactions between private
parties who conduct themselves according to common commercial
practice explains much of the difference between the simplicity of
trade policy and messiness of environmental policy.
Trade transactions take place spontaneously, and the relations
between the parties to the transaction are governed by commercial
law, much of which is culturally universal and has been formally
harmonized at the international level.153 Modern international trade
law, as embodied in the WTO agreements, has the relatively easy task
of establishing agreed ground rules about when and how governments
are permitted to or prohibited from adopting national policies that
ESTY, GREENING, supra note 2, at 75.
152. Information-its collection, analysis, and dissemination-is a matter of
enormous importance for the science-guided world of environmental policy and a
perennial issue for environmental policy analysts. However, environmental
information has only a minor bearing on trade-environment issues, so I have chosen
to omit it from this analysis.
153. Indeed, to a considerable degree the modern laws of international commerce
derive from medieval lex mercatoria, a customary law among merchants engaged in
international trade applied uniformly throughout Europe, which makes it one of the
oldest fields of international law.
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interfere with these private transactions or distort the terms of market
competition that drive the transactions. Because open markets
operate in predictable ways and the means by which governments
seek to interfere with those markets are well known and easy to
identify, the law to control those government actions is rather easily
formulated. The only significant complications come from the
political and economic compromises that permit certain types of
government interference under certain conditions and in accordance
with certain procedures.' Thus, the GATT itself, the core text of
international trade law, is a mere 38 articles, of which only four
establish the key norms of nondiscrimination, freedom of trade from
quantitative restrictions, and the authorization of mutually-agreed
schedules of tariffs on goods. "5 Most of the other WTO agreements,
which run to just a few hundred pages,156 are carefully modulated
exceptions to or elaborations of the GATT,157 or extend the same
principles to new types of international transactions such as services58
or investments.'59
As noted earlier, 6' environmental law is vastly more complex
154. One example: The WTO Agreement on Safeguards, which permits
governments, under specified circumstances and in accordance with prescribed
procedures, to impose extraordinary duties on an imported product to protect home
market producers. Safeguard measures are theoretically questionable and cause
significant trade friction, but they remain politically popular in many countries. See
Alan 0. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence (John M.
Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 187, 2003), available at
<www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html> (visited Oct. 11, 2003).
155. The nondiscrimination principle has two aspects, most-favored-nation
treatment (GATT Art. I) and national treatment (GATT" Art. III). Quantitative
restrictions are generally prohibited by GATT Art. XI. GATT Art. II authorizes
countries to impose tariffs and arranges a procedure for mutual agreement on the
maximum levels of those tariffs for specific goods.
156. In one published version they total less than 400 pages. JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., 2002 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (4th ed. 2002). Wapner's count of 26,000 pages for the
Uruguay Round agreements presumably includes the tariff schedules of the 120
member countries negotiating the agreement. See supra note 1, at 8. The tariff
schedules, though the result of intensive negotiation for commercial advantage and
important for customs officers or trading businesses, are an aggregate of minute
details of no policy significance. What matters for policy are the core texts that
create legal obligations among governments.
157. See, e.g., WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 154.
158. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services.
159. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Annex 1A: Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures.
160. See section III.C.L.b., supra.
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and contingent than trade law:161 complex because almost every
human behavior has multiple environmental effects; contingent
because regulation of those effects depends on our incomplete, ever-
changing, and irreducibly uncertain scientific understanding of the
natural world. In short, it is difficult to reach agreement on the
environmental consequences of different activities, and the changing
availability of technology to avoid, limit, or compensate for those
consequences adds to the complexity. Most environmental law is a
necessary compromise between protecting the natural world from
harm and permitting beneficial human activity that disturbs the
environment. Even the basic survival activities of producing or
acquiring food, preparing it, and disposing of the wastes from food
production and consumption have environmental consequences, and
those consequences have become ecologically significant on a global
scale as agriculturists and fishermen try to feed more than 6 billion
people.
Complexity and contingency are compounded at the
international level by differing cultural attitudes about the values of
nature and political differences about the social and economic trade-
offs to be made in protecting the environment.162  International
environmental law, then, must draw on and be compatible with the
1631a
social and moral values of the world's diverse societies. In the final
analysis, the development of environmental norms becomes an
exercise in moral philosophy'6" that resists reduction to simple
161. Biermann disputes this point with the following argument: "That almost all
countries have established a distinct ministry for the environment reveals that
environmental policy can indeed be dealt with by one focal point within an
administrative system." Biermann, supra note 15, at 51. This assertion is inaccurate,
or at best simplistic. Most states have consolidated pollution control in a single
government agency, but resources issues, management of rivers, seas, and parks, and
energy questions, among other environmentally relevant matters, are invariably
scattered across several other agencies. In the late 1990s, Mexico created a very
expansive ministry of environment, natural resources, and fisheries, but decided a
few years later to remove fisheries issues to another ministry.
162. The legitimacy of these differences is recognized in several principles of the
Rio Declaration, especially Principle 7, which enshrines the concept of "common but
differentiated responsibilities."
163. E.g., "The principle of sustainable development is thus a part of modern
international law by reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by
reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global community." Gabcikovo-
Nagymoros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 25, 1997) (separate opinion
of Vice-President Weeramantry).
164. One basic text among many others is HOLMES ROLSTON, III,
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN THE NATURAL WORLD (1988).
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propositions even within a single society, much less at the
international level. This makes the formulation of environmental
norms a task far more complex and subtle than the articulation of
some basic economic principles to govern an open system of
international economic exchange.
On the other hand, the GEO proponents overstate the lack of
coherent principles underpinning international environmental law.
At a very early stage, the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment set forth twenty-six key principles,165 which were
generally reaffirmed and amplified twenty years later in the Rio
Declaration.'66 Nongovernmental or quasi-intergovernmental groups,
notably the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources (IUCN), have put forward other influential
statements of principles. 67  UNEP, created by the United Nations
immediately after Stockholm, has invested considerable resources in
collating and restating environmental principles under its so-called
Montevideo Programme.1 68 Academic writers have also participated,
not only by compiling and restating internationally enunciated
principles but also by proposing new ones. The preambles to the
North American Free Trade Agreement and the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization refer to selected core
environmental principles.9
165. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, G.A. Res. 2997, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.48/14/Rev/1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
166. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/WG.ILI/L.33/rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874
(1992). Many of Rio's 27 principles repeat or amend the Stockholm principles.
167. E.g., IUCN, THE WORLD CHARTER FOR NATURE (1982); ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Robert D. Munro & Johan G. Lammers eds., 1986).
168. Report of the Meeting of Senior Government Officials Expert in
Environmental Law to Prepare a Programme for the Development and Periodic
Review of Environmental Law for the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century,
Annex 1: The Draft Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of
Environmental Law for the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, U.N.
Environment Programme, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Env.Law/4/4 (2000). This is commonly
known as Montevideo Programme III, a continuation of UNEP's efforts for the
development of environmental law that began in 1982.
169. For NAFrA, the countries commit to undertake their trade arrangements "in
a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation," including
sustainable development and the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.
NAFTA, December 17, 1992. For the WTO agreement, the preamble recognizes that
trade and economic relations should "allow[] for the optimal use of the world's
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development [and] seek[]
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It is not clear how a GEO could make a fresh contribution to this
process. Though some find a principle like "sustainable
development" hopelessly broad and devoid of meaning for policy
makers,17 it is the product of vigorous efforts by environmental
experts from many countries to articulate a fundamental guiding
principle for environmental law. This is just the kind of coherence
work for which a GEO is proposed, but for which there seems to be
little need. In the end, coherence of environmental law is not an
impediment to trade-environment policy. The greater challenge is to
persuade the WTO to retool its own policies with the established
environmental principles in mind. Experience to date with the trade-
environment interplay gives no reason to expect that a new
environmental organization would overcome the reluctance of trade
experts to come to grips with environmental issues. The UNEP
secretariats of the major international environmental agreements are
already recognized observers at the WTO's Committee on Trade and
Environment, and they have tried to educate the WTO membership
about their work, though this dialogue has not yet borne fruit in terms
of policy reform.
b. Coordination
The WTO system certainly exhibits a high degree of
coordination, especially since the revised and augmented set of trade
agreements that came into force in 1995 requires WTO members to
subscribe to an integrated package of agreements. As its membership
and agenda of issues has grown, it is not obvious that the WTO can
maintain this coordination over time. Bilateral and regional trade
agreements are proliferating7 ' and govern an increasing proportion of
the world's trade. The wide range of complex issues now facing the
WTO in its Doha or Development Round of trade negotiations may
lead to some fragmentation of issues or to further aggrandizement by
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so
in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development." Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15,1994.
170. Daniel C. Esty, A Term's Limits, supra note 146.
171. The United States has recently concluded separate agreements with
Singapore and Chile and has opened negotiations with Australia, Morocco, Central
America, and five countries in southern Africa. At the same time, regional trading
blocs are being aggressively pursued by East Asian and Southeast Asian countries,
and in 2004 the European Union will expand to 25 members. The growth of regional,
rather than global, trade negotiations has been highlighted recently by Bernard K.
Gordon in A High Risk Trade Policy, 82 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 105 (2003).
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regional trading blocs. By comparison with international
environmental governance, however, these coordination difficulties
seem modest. The WTO is still the only international organization at
the center of trade policy discussion and development.
Coordination has been a holy grail of environmental policy
analysts from the very beginning of the environmental movement.
Many have urged a restructuring of domestic environmental
governance in the United States in both the executive and legislative
branches. 72 Except for President Nixon's reorganization plan putting
scattered air and water pollution agencies into a single new
Environmental Protection Agency, 173 such proposals have fallen on
deaf political ears. Internationally, the history of coordination
proposals and government response has been similar. UNEP plays
the coordination role to some extent. It brings different international
agencies together for negotiation of agreements, serves as an
umbrella agency for the secretariats of some of the most important
agreements, and has a governing council as a regular forum for
discussion and decision by top environmental officials.' But multiple
U.N. and other agencies retain their distinct competence over certain
aspects of environmental governance, including the Food and
Agricultural Organization with respect to agriculture and fisheries,
the U.N. Development Program with respect to community
development and special needs of the developing countries, and the
World Health Organization with respect to sanitation and other
health-related aspects of environmental protection.7 '  The
coordination problem is not a matter of trying for complete
unification of policy across all these entities, but perhaps improving
linkages within the several clusters of agreements and programs that
172. As summed up in William Reilly's 1987 comment: "Fundamental changes in
concepts, in laws, and in the organizational structure of legislative and executive
branch activities are essential if further progress is to be made on long-standing
environmental issues and newly recognized ones alike." CONSERVATION
FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT: A VIEW TOWARD THE NINETIES (1987).
Two years later, Mr. Reilly was the Administrator of the (un-reorganized)
Environmental Protection Agency.
173. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623, available at
<www.epa.gov/history/org/origins/reorg.htm> (visited Oct. 7, 2003).
174. See, e.g., YOUNG, GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, at 170 (commenting on the
"genius" of UNEP's "success in coordinating the activities of an array of interested
agencies" in the negotiation of the agreement to reduce pollution in the
Mediterranean).
175. Part II.B.1. of this article presents the argument that this diversity of
organizations is healthy.
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deal with interrelated issues.
Another sign that absence of coordination may be less important
than GEO proponents suggest is that regional entities have
sometimes spurred or hosted the negotiation of new agreements.
International non-governmental organizations can also play a critical
role, both as instigators of policy proposals and as unofficial
coordinators across formal agency boundaries. The IUCN has a
distinguished record in this regard, including its World Charter for
Nature, which strongly influenced the negotiations over the Rio
Declaration. The successes of each of these organizational
contributors in advancing international environmental law calls into
question whether lack of formal coordination is a weakness in
environmental governance. The historical record gives stronger
support to the view that a diversity of organizations has strengthened
governance by allowing each organization to bring its own skills and
strengths to the endeavor as the occasion arises.'77
For the reasons already given with respect to coherence-
complexity, contingency, and culture-the WTO seems strikingly
inappropriate as a model for coordinating all of global environmental
policy through a single umbrella organization. Moreover, it is far
from obvious that tighter coordination among the different centers of
environmental activity would promote international environmental
governance interaction with trade or enhance the environmental
voice on trade-environment policy. The most important multilateral
environmental agreements that raise significant trade-environment
questions are already loosely coordinated through UNEP and have
observer status in the work of the WTO Committee on Trade and
Environment. On that score, little would be gained by reassigning
them to a GEO. More meaningful would be a coordinated discussion
of trade-environment issues among world environmental officials and
the potential for a coordinated response to the most prominent of
them on behalf of a large majority of governments. Here
coordination and coherence begin to merge, and the points raised
earlier with respect to coherence apply to coordination as well. For
all intents and purposes, UNEP is already available to play this role
globally. On a sub-global level, the OECD has already made several
176. The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, for example, has been an active
forum for negotiating international environmental agreements. See YOUNG,
GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, at 164-65.
177. See generally id. at 163-83.
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major policy contributions on both environmental policy coordination
per se and on coordination of views on trade-environment. In both
respects, then, a GEO offers little new potential.
3. Matters of Scale
Many of the leading matters of concern with respect to
international environmental governance, such as climate change and
stratospheric ozone depletion, are matters of global scale. Such
problems call for an institutional response at the global level, and a
GEO might enhance governance of such issues. To the extent that
trade policy is a matter for decision in the WTO, the trade-
environment problematique is also a global scale matter, which
supports the call for a GEO to engage the environmental community
globally in its resolution.
With respect to governance, however, scale can be deceptive.
Many environmental problems that are inherently global in scope
may be somewhat divisible and then can be managed effectively at a
regional level. Sea turtle protection, for example, is a global issue
because of the turtles' wide-ranging migratory patterns, but most
turtle populations have a "home" country or region where.they nest.
Moreover, the human pressures on sea turtle populations vary from
country to country and region to region. Because of its special
interest in sea turtle populations spending part of their lives in U.S.
waters, the United States chose to promote a convention regime for
turtle protection first at the level of the Western Hemisphere. '78
Interestingly, this scale choice became an issue in the WTO dispute
over U.S. restrictions on imports of shrimp from certain Asian
nations, which had not been invited to participate in the negotiation
of this convention.
179
Scale can be equally deceptive with respect to trade policy.
There is no doubt that there is only one WTO, and that any trade
policy affecting all 148 members must be agreed by an appropriate
majority of those members (or in practice by consensus). Thus, a
global trade and environment policy would have to go through the
WTO. But many countries participate as well in regional trade
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement,
178. Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea
Turtles, Dec. 1, 1996, reprinted in 1 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 179 (1998).
179. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 166 (Nov. 6, 1998).
2003]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Mercosur, and the European Communities. Trade among members
to those regional agreements is subject to the regional agreement
provisions, which may differ from the WTO agreements.'8 ° With
respect to trade and the environment in particular, NAFTA is
"greener" than the WTO in several respects.' Moreover, the
NAFTA countries simultaneously agreed to the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, which established a
moderately powerful North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC). 82  Thus, among the three
NAFTA countries, the institutional rules and organizational
configuration on trade and environment differs significantly from the
WTO norm.
A close consideration of scale, then, leads to substantial
skepticism that a GEO-WTO configuration is the only effective way
to resolve trade and environment policy. For many countries, or
many environmental advocates, a regional resolution of trade and
environment might yield more progressive results. And regional
initiatives, if successful, might then be more diligently pursued or
more readily accepted at the WTO level. A GEO would offer no
pathway to such regional differentiation.
D. Political Power
All the preceding discussion has scarcely touched on the most
obvious and important difference between the relatively strong
authority of the WTO and international trade policy on the one hand
and the supposed diffuseness and relative ineffectiveness of UNEP
and international environmental policy on the other. That difference
is the matter of political power: what the member countries invest in
the WTO as compared with UNEP and other environmental
organizations. This is reflected not in direct financial contributions
(which are comparable), but in political capital-the time, effort, and
resources the governments devote to their national participation in
180. See generally, Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the
EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L
L. 231 (1997).
181. Richard H. Steinberg, Explaining Similarities and Differences across
International Trade Organizations, in THE GREENING OF TRADE LAW:
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 277, 282-85
(Richard H. Steinberg, ed., 2002).
182. On the CEC generally, see GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN
COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (David L. Markell & John H.
Knox, eds., 2003).
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the organization's activities. Governments put a lot of effort and
political prestige into international trade policy; considerably less
effort and prestige goes to international environmental policy. This
political power differential exists in all governments in all regions of
the world.
Recent work of Shaffer on trade policy sheds some analytical
light on the disparities in political power between international trade
and international environment. Drawing on the intergovernmental
theory of international organizations, Shaffer identifies a two-level
game of intergovernmental relations in the work of the WTO
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE).'83 Intergovernmental
theory teaches that in any international organization the member
states are engaged in a competition with each other for influence over
the organization's positions or outcomes. In the two-level variant of
intergovernmental theory, the international competition between the
member states is understood to be shaped by domestic,
intragovernmental competition for control of the national position to
be expressed in the international forum. Thus, with respect to the
CTE, the lack of progress on the issues is not simply the result of
differences of views between countries, but also of unresolved
differences of views within countries. Views that were politically
salient domestically were expressed internationally, even if those
views sometimes contradicted positions taken by the same
government on other related issues."
In the United States, the second level of the two-level game plays
out through an interagency policy-making process with substantial
indirect participation and lobbying by interested members of
Congress, private business groups, and public interest
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). On environment and trade
issues, the game is played as follows. International environmental
policy is a responsibility shared by small units within large agencies
that have other preoccupations. The lead agencies are the Office of
International Activities at EPA and parts of the Bureau of Oceans,
Environment, and Scientific Affairs at the State Department. Even
less robust elements of other agencies-including a handful of
international affairs specialists at the Department of the Interior, at
183. Gregory C. Shaffer, The Nexus of Law and Politics: The WTO's Committee
on Trade and Environment, in THE GREENING OF TRADE LAW: INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 81, 83-84 (Richard H.
Steinberg ed., 2002).
184. Id. at 93-96.
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the National Marine Fisheries Service in the Department of
Commerce, and at the Food and Drug Administration-participate in
the interagency dialogue, along with agencies representing economic
interests that might be affected by the particular environmental
policy. Various interests outside government, including businesses,
environmental organizations, and the scientific community, seek to
influence the U.S. government position on the issues. The entire
process is managed and mediated by the State Department, with a
significant role for the EPA. The State Department has final
authority to determine the position that will be taken on behalf of the
United States and the membership of the delegation to international
meeting.
The U.S. position on issues under consideration in the WTO is
formulated through a similar interagency process. The Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), a unit of the Executive Office of
the President, has the lead role on trade issues. A large number of
other agencies, most importantly the International Trade
Administration of the Department of Commerce and the Foreign
Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture, are key
participants in the interagency dialogue. Businesses, NGOs,
members of Congress, and other interested parties seek to influence
the U.S. position through communication with these agencies and
meetings with agency staff. For WTO or other issues arising under
trade agreements, USTR has ultimate policy control.
By extension of the two-level game Shaffer describes, the
competition between the WTO and UNEP for primacy, or at least
parity, on trade-environment issues can be viewed as a three-level
game, with the third level of competition, both internationally and
domestically, being the competition for the degree of status and
authority to confer on each of the two international organizations.
For there to be a balance between international environmental policy
and international trade policy at the international level,
intergovernmental game theory suggests that there will need to be a
comparable balance at the domestic level. There is no such balance
in the United States, nor in other governments around the world.
In terms of policy making in Washington, USTR is dedicated
exclusively to issues of international trade and has high political status
and preferred access to the president's staff as part of the Executive
Office of the President. It is reinforced by other strong government
units with a trade focus, including the Bureau of Economic Affairs at
the State Department, the International Trade Administration at the
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Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, and often
Treasury. Congress monitors and supports trade issues through
specialized staff on two of the most important committees, House
Ways and Means and Senate Finance.
International environmental issues, by contrast, are handled by
subordinate units of agencies-State and EPA-that have much
broader agendas. International environmental issues rarely get
attention in the White House, though the Clinton Administration did
have an international environmental specialist assigned to the
influential National Security Council. Congressional responsibility
for international environmental issues is scattered across several
committees, so there is no long-term focus of expertise or interest.
Even with respect to trade-environment issues as such, the trade
interests have the upper hand politically. USTR now has a staff of
about six environmental affairs specialists, led by an Assistant U.S.
Trade Representative for Environment and Natural Resources. EPA
or the State Department have only a few staff knowledgeable about
trade issues who are scattered in several units. During the Clinton
Administration, which gave some attention to these issues, EPA had
just one professional assigned full-time to trade-environment issues.
In the world beyond Washington, the political voice of the
United States is equally asymmetrical between trade and
environment. USTR has an office of about 25 people in Geneva,
headed by a politically-appointed Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
with the rank of ambassador. The Geneva office maintains daily
contact with WTO secretariat staff and the trade missions of other
WTO members. Moreover, the United States maintains significant
trade or commercial missions in several embassies, and has a
commercial attach6 at most others. U.S. representation to UNEP, by
contrast, has the dedicated attention of just a couple of people posted
to the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, with other experts or political
representatives coming in from Washington as the occasion arises.
Although the State Department has foreign service officers in
embassies around the world who are responsible, as part of their
work, for reporting on environmental issues, only the embassy in
Mexico City has a full-time environmental attach6 from EPA.
These disparities in government resources allocated to the
agendas of these two international organizations and in the domestic
political clout of the respective agencies become part of the
expression of U.S. policy in international fora. Trade issues get more
consistent, focused attention than international environmental issues.
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The situation is the same for other governments; trade ministers have
more clout than environment ministers'85 and most are not distracted
by purely domestic responsibilities or have closely related
responsibilities such as industrial development.'
8 6
Trade and environment issues have not been neglected on this
account, but they have received significant attention only when
environmental protest against trade agreements or trade policy
decisions significantly threatened domestic support for new
international trade initiatives in key centers of power, especially the
United States and the European Union. This was certainly true with
respect to the significant new steps in trade and environment policy
made during the negotiation of and campaign for congressional
approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992-93.
Similarly, the Committee on Trade and Environment in the WTO
was created in 1994 at the behest of the United States, which still had
to consider the risk that environmental opposition at home could
scuttle the agreement that established the WTO. Environmental
provisions introduced into the Doha trade summit documents that
launched the current "development round" of trade negotiations in
2001 were worked out between the United States and Europe so that
the broader trade initiatives could move forward without strong
objection from domestic environmental organizations or green
parties.
There are at least two lessons to draw from the imbalance of
political power when considering the GEO as a potential counterpart
to the WTO. There is some tendency to discuss the forging of trade-
environment policy as a contest between contending policies and
preferences. From this perspective, the lesson is that lack of effective
political support for the environmental side means that the WTO
norms will continue to be privileged over trade norms because the
environmental norms lack political traction, and the formation of a
GEO would not alter the balance of power. But from another
perspective, the imbalance of political power draws our attention to
185. In terms of the realities of power politics, it may be telling that very few trade
ministers are women (the Americans Carla Hills under President George H.W. Bush
and Charlene Barshefsky under President Clinton are exceptional in that regard) but
many environment ministers are women. For several years, the governing council of
the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation comprised three
women environment ministers.
186. Mexican trade policy is managed by the Secretariat of International Trade
and Industrial Development. Japan's trade agency is the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry.
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the dominant position of the WTO (as representative of trade policy
makers) in the trade-environment dialogue, which means that
meaningful reform will only come when the WTO is prepared to
accept it. The lesson then is that the primary task for environmental
policy makers is to change attitudes. Could a GEO assist in that
process? Undoubtedly it could, but its role would be secondary.
Environmentalists and environmental policy makers must start by
becoming stronger players at the first-domestic-level of Shaffer's
policy game before they can have a chance to be effective
internationally at the second and third levels.
III. Building Bridges Between Environmental and Trade Policy
"But now," says the Once-ler,
"Now that you're here,
the word of the Lorax seems perfectly clear.
UNLESS someone like you
cares a whole awful lot,
nothing is going to get better.
It's not."
Part II argued that a more streamlined organizational framework
for environmental policy development at the international level
would be ineffective to advance trade-environment policy. The
governance challenge is to persuade governments, businesses, and
other economic decision makers that environmental issues need to be
taken into consideration in every policy context, whether it is public
health, agriculture, technology, economics, or social planning.
Organization of international affairs should promote the process of
attitudinal change needed to bring about reform of trade and
environment policy.' Centralization of international environmental
expertise in a single GEO might help raise the political salience of
environmental issues for governments and for businesses and
environmentalists who participate in its work, but a unified
organization for international environmental policy would bear the
significant risk of drawing the attention of environmental officials and
experts inward onto environmental issues and isolating them from the
officials and experts directing economic or other areas of policy. 8
187. Juma, supra note 73.
188. Carlos A. Calderin, The Emergence of a Responsible Green World Trade
Organization: Why Creating a World Environment Organization Would Hinder This
Goal, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 35, 65-66 (2002).
2003]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The likely interplay between a GEO and the WTO would
resemble a see-saw, with each organization trying to gain political
weight to tip the balance of policy in its direction. A see-saw is
inherently unstable and keeps the two sides apart. A more apt
metaphor for the desired form of international governance is a
bridge,'89 a pathway to the movement of ideas and policies across the
cultural divide, drawing the two cultures together in common
enterprise.
What is most needed is policy integration.9  This is not
glamorous work, and it will not lead to revolutionary changes in a
short period of time. The painfully slow advance of trade-
environment issues in the WTO's CTE is cause for concern, and lends
credence to the pessimists who are convinced that the trade
community will never learn to accept environmental constraints on
their norms. GEO proponents are undoubtedly right, too, that there
are many steps that environmentalists can take on their own to
address environmental issues in ways that would ameliorate trade-
environment conflicts, though in that respect, too, building bridges
will accomplish more than remodeling the environmental citadel.
Environmentalists have much homework yet to do to understand
economics and trade policy, and to be able to identify and evaluate
the economic costs and side effects associated with the use of trade
measures as a tool of environmental policy.
By the same token, limited and judicious use of trade measures
can serve as a lever to shift economic incentives in favor of
environmental protection. Trade policy makers need to be more
candid in admitting that trade policy frequently deviates from pure
liberal economics, and accept environmental protection as one
possible basis for such controlled deviations. Thus, a suitable
resolution of the trade-environment problematique will certainly
require adjustments to trade policy, which can only be made by trade
189. The one NGO dedicated to the process of trade and environment policy
integration, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development,
appropriately calls its monthly newsletter "Bridges," available at <www.ictsd.org>
(visited Oct. 11, 2003).
190. Agenda 21 calls on governments to "[p]romote a dialogue between trade,
development, and environment communities." Agenda 21, supra note 24, 2.22(b).
This was reaffirmed in the preparations for the Johannesburg summit. See, e.g., U.N.
Environment Programme, Expert Consultations on International Environmental
Governance, Chairman's Summary, T 2 ("Most participants were of the view that
integrating and balancing economic, social and environmental concerns is at the core
of sustainable development.").
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policy makers. They should not be allowed to escape responsibility
by saying: "That's not our problem; that's for those folks at the
GEO." Trade policy makers will only learn a more ecological form of
economic thinking, albeit reluctantly, if they are compelled to
research, think about, and deliberate over environmental issues
within the context of trade policy. Moreover, only repeated
discussion of environmental issues in the WTO will force
governments to begin integrating environmental and economic policy
in their national capitals so that the policy game can be played at both
levels of Shaffer's two-level game.
A. Bridges: Addressing Fit, Interplay and Scale
Deploying Oran Young's institutional design criteria again,
putting the institutional effort into building bridges between trade
and environment: 1) fits the governance problem; 2) would promote
interplay horizontally and vertically; and 3) would be congruent with
the scale of trade and environment problems.
In terms of fit, even if a GEO could improve international
environmental coherence, coordination, and information, the lack of
political power behind it means that would have no prospect of
influencing trade policy. The existence of a GEO seems, instead,
more likely to allow the WTO to continue to avoid trade policy
reform by pushing governance responsibility off onto the
environmental community. Along with others,'91 I continue to believe
that the critical trade and environment "problem" is the intransigence
of the trade community in the face of reasonable proposals for some
environmental conditions or limitations on trade. The remedy for
that problem is an organized effort to educate trade policy makers
and institutional and organizational arrangements that keep the
pressure on the WTO to make suitable policy changes.9  The
191. Von Moltke, supra note 139, at 27-28 ("Paradoxically the place to demand
significant organizational change is the WTO and not the environmental regimes."
He calls the WTO "outdated," "inaccessible" and "unaware."); Paehlke, supra note
51, at 9 ("Strange as it may seem, the WTO almost of necessity must be 'greened."');
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, TRADE, LABOR, AND LEGITIMACY 25 (U.C. Berkeley Public
Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 116, 2003) (making the argument on the
analogous subject of trade and labor issues that "[t]he most promising institution
within which to produce such a solution is an appropriately reformed WTO.").
192. Oran R. Young & George J. Demko, Improving the Effectiveness of
International Environmental Governance Systems, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 229, 231 (Oran R. Young et al. eds.,
1996) (discussing the need to match the institution to the nature of the problem).
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environmental community has some learning of its own to do. The
bridge that I envision would be a two-way path, putting an onus on
the environmental community to become more knowledgeable about
the economic theories and principles underlying trade policy. In
short, what fits the problem are institutions for cultural exchange
between trade and environment, and organizations to orchestrate that
exchange.
Cultural exchange also describes the element of horizontal
interplay between trade institutions and environment institutions that
needs to occur. More important, though, is the matter of vertical
interplay. The reconciliation of trade and environmental policy
making cannot occur at the international level before foundations
have been laid in a number of national and regional systems. Trade-
environment policy needs to begin at home. Policy integration at the
national level has already occurred to a considerable extent in the
United States and many of the European countries, and they have
consequently been the most thoughtful contributors to the work of
the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment. Even in the
United States, though, a tendency persists for the trade experts to
marginalize the environmental agencies in the policy-making process.
Bridges need almost constant maintenance work; true policy
integration will require a similarly constant commitment.
The matter of scale raises the question whether some trade and
environment tensions would not be more effectively resolved at the
regional level, through regional trade agreements and associated
"REOs" or regional environmental organizations. As noted earlier,
one proponent of a GEO likes the idea of the North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and sought to
"extend the logic" behind it to the multilateral level.'93 Since its
establishment in 1994, the CEC has proved itself to be an effective, if
modest, organization that has contributed to improved environmental
policy in North America and has assisted in addressing trade-
environment problems and potentials through research, policy
recommendations, and dispute resolution procedures.'94 The more
telling lesson of the CEC works the other way-that regional
organizations may be able to succeed where global organizations
would fail. Governments in regional environmental organizations
193. RUNGE, FREER TRADE, supra note 15, at 101.
194. For an overview of the work of the CEC, see GREENING NAFTA, supra note
182.
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have common problems and a more immediate stake in solving them.
Consensus is much easier to reach regionally than multilaterally,
leading to more creative and more effective initiatives. Many issues
thought of as global problems may be more amenable to management
at a regional level. Investment in creating new environmental
organizations would arguably be better spent on establishing CECs
for other regions around the world rather than a global GEO.195
Some may argue that an insistence on policy integration arises
from naive faith in the content-less concept of sustainable
development. '96 Sustainable development, like democracy or justice,
may be an all-encompassing and contestable concept, but it captures
the fundamental truth that environmental problems have economic
roots and many economic problems have environmental roots. Both
aspects need to be addressed. Moreover, the trade-environment
problematique cannot escape entanglement with matters of economic
development. Many of the trade-environment disputes that have
arisen within the WTO have originated with complaints from
developing countries that a developed country was violating its trade
obligations by restricting import of goods from developing countries
in the name of protecting its own environment. Only an integrated
approach to trade and environment can succeed, perhaps including as
well mechanisms to use the economic gains from trade to finance
basic infrastructure projects in developing countries to alleviate the
environmental harms suffered by hundreds of millions of people
living in poverty.
What all governance reformers seek is effective ways of changing
behavior. On trade and environment, we need institutions and
approaches that will change attitudes of people (whether businesses,
communities, or individuals) whose actions are, for better or for
worse, still influenced primarily by economic considerations. For
environmentalists, the goal is either to persuade people to change
their attitudes and include environmental considerations as part of
their motivation, or to make it clear to them through the market place
195. In the context of drawing lessons from NAFTA for the Free Trade Area of the
Americas, I make many of these same arguments in Sanford E. Gaines, The Free
Trade Area of the Americas: Lessons from North America, in THE GREENING OF
TRADE LAW: INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
81, 83-84 (Richard H. Steinberg ed., 2002).
196. Wapner has a slightly different concern-that "environmentalism may be
unable to respond.., because it is stuck with the challenge of not being able to do
anything unless it does everything." Wapner, supra note 1, at 9.
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(either by a free-market cost internalization approach or by
mandatory regulation) that they will be better off choosing the
environmentally preferable options. This internalization (of value or
of attitudes) needs to pervade the system, including at the highest
levels of making economic policy such as the WTO.
B. The Way Forward
The cause is far from hopeless. However slowly, the policy
integration process is already under way. What more can be done to
build the bridge?
The first step is to bring environmental officials into the trade
policy deliberation process. Already, the WTO Committee on Trade
and Environment provides a ready occasion for that involvement.
More and more governments are bringing their environmental
officials to the table at the CTE, and the WTO has accredited a
number of international environmental organizations as observers at
the CTE meetings, and has invited them to speak on occasion. It
would also be helpful to revive the work of the Joint Session of Trade
and Environment Experts in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). For several years during
the 1990s, this activity brought together trade experts from the
OECD's Trade Committee and environment experts from the
Environment Committee for structured discussion and analysis of
most aspects of the trade-environment interface. This work resulted
in useful reports and even in some policy recommendations approved
by the OECD Council of Ministers. Unfortunately, the OECD is
viewed with some suspicion by developing countries, just as the
developed countries tend to ignore the commendable trade and
environment analytic work done by the U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), which is considered an organ
dominated by developing country views.
Another step, particularly necessary for the WTO, is for a more
open dialogue with the community of environmental NGOs and other
representatives of civil society. To its credit, the WTO has responded
to the pressure from civil society and governments by reaching out to
the community of international environmental NGOs and by making
some of its deliberative processes more transparent. ' 97 These changes
197. One example is the public symposia that the WTO has convened in which
environmentalists and others share the podium and the discussion time with
government trade officials and WTO staff. The most recent symposium was held on
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empower the NGOs themselves as participants in the trade-
environment policy debates and reinforce the authority of national
environmental agencies vis-A-vis the trade agencies within each
country by demonstrating that those agencies represent an important
constituency that can influence trade policy.
With encouragement and financial support from the WTO or
from select governments, certain nongovernmental organizations are
capable of playing an educational role or a role as conveners of off-
the-record discussions among government policy makers. The IUCN
was mentioned earlier. The International Centre for Trade and
Sustainable Development has good connections to the trade
community as well as the environmental community, and is already
committed to building bridges. It would be a good candidate to
convene off-the-record "negotiations" under suitable auspices. The
North American CEC has also accumulated considerable expertise in
trade-environment analysis, and other governments or organizations
should draw on its expertise. The CEC also has a record of
successfully engaging outside experts from academia and civil society
in its work, a model for the WTO and others to follow.
Another way to build bridges is through transgovernmental
relations, more specifically transgovernmental networks. Kal
Raustiala has documented a substantial development of
transgovernmental networks in the field of environmental
regulation.'98 Comparable networks exist in the world of trade
policy," and there are some networks beginning to emerge around
trade and environment issues specifically. Importantly, Raustiala sees
these informal networks as supportive of rather than contradictory to
the effort to develop more formal substantive rules and
organizations.2  The OECD, although in a formal sense an
June 16-18, 2003, on the theme, "Challenges Ahead on the Road to Canciin."
198. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1
(2002).
199. Indeed, one of the primary functions of the large trade policy staffs in Geneva
maintained by the larger nations is to develop and make use of networks of informal
relations with their counterparts from other governments to help shape and frame
issues before they come up for formal discussion in WTO committees. Some of these
networks have become so well established and have lasted for so long that they have
acquired names and are looked to as influence brokers on the issues of their concern.
The so-called Cairns Group of major agriculture exporting countries is a prime
example.
200. Raustiala, supra note 198, at 70-90.
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international organization in its own right, frequently serves to
promote informal, non-binding examination of policy issues among
relevant government experts of the member countries. Another small
sign of progress is that, to some extent, substantive issues in trade or
in environment are already being addressed by direct sharing of
information and cooperation between governments outside the
boundaries of formal international organizations.' In this
transgovernmental work, there is a rough equivalence between the
trade and the environment realms.
As a final note on bridge-building, a great advantage of the
evolutionary approach to new institutions and perhaps new
organizations is that it is flexible and non-exclusive. If a GEO were
established, by design as well as by bureaucratic nature it would
become the exclusive official organization for environmental officials
to work on the development of trade and environment policy. In the
evolutionary spirit, policy entrepreneurs should consider instead
trying to subvert the monopoly power of the WTO over trade policy.
Already, the NAFTA differs from the WTO agreements on a number
of issues of environmental concern and its operation is modulated to
some extent by the work of the CEC. Similarly, the European Union
has its own trade rules and its own mechanisms for managing the
trade-environment interface, including an important role for the
European Court of Justice in interpreting both the interplay between
"free movement of goods" and environmental protection in the EU
treaty and the relationship between EU law and WTO law. 02 Other
regional trade organizations may present opportunities for unique or
innovative approaches to trade and environment issues, approaches
that could then be exported to other regions, or presented for
consideration at the world level.
Conclusion
The world community was galvanized to action on trade policy
201. The provisions of the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade
are the culmination of a procedure first developed voluntarily by the international
chemical industry under U.N. auspices and with the encouragement of many
governments. The voluntary procedure continues as an "interim" measure pending
the entry into force of the convention.
202. Joanne Scott, On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in
the EU and WTO, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 125 (J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2000).
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by the common conviction that protectionist economic policies set the
Great Depression in motion, which in turn set the stage for the world-
wide catastrophe of the Second World War. To this day, government
representatives to the WTO invoke the specter of the 1930s and 1940s
as a reason to adhere firmly to the principles of liberal trade and to
resist surreptitious protectionism in any guise, including the green
guise of environmentalism. The weak coherence and power of
international environmental law demonstrate that the global political
will to address environmental issues aggressively on their own terms
has yet to coalesce. 03 The world has not, and we hope will not need
to, suffer a single encompassing environmental catastrophe of the
magnitude of the Great Depression as the catalyst for political unity
on environmental protection. The process of invigorating political
will on the environment, therefore, seems likely to be a continuation
of the progress of the last thirty or forty years, an accumulation of
incremental changes in understanding, in popular attitude, in political
commitment, and in policy reform. An evaluation of the current state
of international environmental norms in comparison to the enormous
agenda of work set forth by the Johannesburg summit on sustainable
development six months ago shows how far the world still has to go."
But if we compare international environmental norms and
governance today with their condition forty years ago, we can see
how far the world has come.0 5 The international environmental
governance glass may be half empty, but at least it is slowly getting
fuller, not emptier.
This Article has argued that the creation of a global
environmental organization would not help fill the glass any faster.
The GEO proposals spring from two understandable but
questionable premises. The first premise is that a major, complex
problem like international environmental protection requires an
organization to manage it. But as Young succinctly observes, "Nor
can we simply assume that such problems will prove unyielding when
203. Juma, supra note 73, at 13.
204. See generally Wapner, supra note 1.
205. Two examples are the growth of sustainable development principles in the
law of the United Kingdom and the shift in the environmental attitudes of developing
countries from Stockholm (1972) to Rio (1992) to Johannesburg (2002). On
sustainable development law in the United Kingdom, see Victoria Jenkins, Placing
Sustainable Development at the Heart of Government in the UK: The Role of Law in
the Evolution of Sustainable Development as the Central Organising Principle of
Government, 22 LEG. STUDIES 578 (2002). On the changing attitudes of developing
countries, see Wapner, supra note 1, at 4-6.
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governance systems are not accompanied by the formal organizations
of government. ' '206  The second flawed premise is that an
organizational structure will somehow overcome the conditions that
have so far impeded environmental governance. But to quote Young
again, "governance involves the establishment and operation of social
institutions .... There is nothing in this way of framing the issue that
presupposes the need to create material entities or organizations (that
is, governments) to administer the rules of the game that arise to
handle the function of governance. ,27
In my estimation, a GEO does not fit the problem and will not
foster the necessary interplay of ideas and policies within
governments, between governments, or between international
organizations. It also incorrectly presupposes that global governance
problems in general, and the trade-environment problem in
particular, can only be addressed effectively at the global level.
Indeed, I believe that a GEO will not only be ineffective but
could be counterproductive in addressing the key governance
problem it is intended to resolve-the trade-environment
problematique. As emphasized in Part II.D. above, any imbalances in
the political power of the trade interests vis-A-vis environmental
interests have their foundation in the structures and institutions of
national political systems. International trade policy works well
because of the collective judgment of the WTO members that they
are individually better off because they have agreed to a strong
system of mutual restraints on national economic policy. The
national support for that grand compromise is always tenuous,
however, and nations shape and reshape their individual approaches
to trade policy through continuous national political debate. For
environmental interests to be effective in engaging the trade
community in trade-environment policy reform, they need to
participate vigorously in that national trade policy debate. Only if
they can prevail, or at least become a major factor, in the national
debate can environmentalists hope to influence how the government
presents and negotiates the issues at the international level.28 To
206. YOUNG, GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, at 26.
207. Id. at 15-16.
208. NAFTA, negotiated in 1991 and 1992, has environmental provisions that
Mexico and Canada accepted as part of the agreement, but that they rejected as part
of the closing round of negotiations in the Uruguay Round in 1993. The explanation
for the shift in attitude is that the U.S. environmental lobby held the balance of
political power over NAFTA approval in the U.S. Congress, so Mexico and Canada
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paraphrase Tip O'Neill, all international trade politics is national.
Trade-environment tensions reflect more fundamental tensions
between environmental protection and the intensification of
economic activity to provide for a growing world population. Some
tensions may arise from misperceptions-an undiscriminating faith in
market economics, a misguided fear that environmental protection
will cost firms and nations in the international marketplace, a distrust
of markets implicit in many environmental policies. But at their core
they arise from the essential environmental challenge to the
prevailing paradigms of economic policy. Even some economists are
ready to concede the point: "It is perhaps time to acknowledge
that.., the global economy may be environmentally unsustainable
and therefore unstable in the long term .... ,, Thus, economic
policy needs to be fundamentally reconsidered. In terms of trade and
environment, and relations between the WTO and UNEP as the
representative international organizations for these two policy
spheres, this means that the WTO needs to reshape or make
adjustments to some of the core precepts of international trade.
Rather than shifting the policy focus from the WTO to a new
organization, environmentalists must continue to insist that the WTO
itself grapple with these issues and make policy reforms.
But the situation is not nearly so urgent as the GEO proponents
make out, nor as dire as the green antiglobalization protesters claim.
While some, perhaps many, economists admit to the unsustainability
of current patterns of production and consumption in the long run,
that does not mean that global economic affairs are unstable in the
short term."' There is time yet to work on options, to devise
solutions, to forge the political will through discourse rather than a
crisis response. There is time yet to build bridges between the still
isolated cultures of the environmental community and the trade
community, and to integrate the best of both cultures in forging new
and environmentally sound conceptions of economic development
and exchange.
made some compromises to help assure NAFTA passage. In the Uruguay Round, the
power of U.S. environmentalists was substantially weaker. By the time the debate
began over new trade negotiating authority in 1994 and 1995, the environmentalists
had even less support in Congress, and the trade-environment agenda lost much of its
significance as an element of U.S. trade policy.
209. Paehlke, supra note 51, at 4.
210. "It may even be more stable in the short to medium term than a world of
relatively autarkic capitalist economies." Id.
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